12/7 part VI: THE PEARL HARBOR SMOKING GUN

MCCOLLUM'S MEMO: EIGHT POINTS TO TOTAL WAR

In his research for Day of Deceit, the Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor, Robert Stinnett was assisted greatly by the Freedom of Information Act (explicitly thanking the act’s author, Rep. John Moss) and by Oliver Stone, whose film JFK had put public pressure on President Clinton to declassify sheaves of secret files in the mid-1990s. Some of these apparently went back well before Kennedy’s time, entering Stinnett’s radar field – the Pearl Harbor attack. He describes receiving bundles of documents not seen since 1941, “covered with dust, tightly bunched together in the boxes and tied with unusual waxed twine.” [1]

Stinnett’s prime discovery was a top-secret October 7, 1940 memo by Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East Division at the Office of Naval Intelligence. Written less than two weeks after Japan signed its mutual defense pact with Italy and Germany, this memo was the source of Roosevelt’s provocation policy. McCollum saw in the new tripartite pact a way into the European war, and besides, as Stinnett explained it, McCollum “felt that war with Japan was inevitable and that the United States should provoke it at a time which suited US interests.” [2] McCollum’s memo advocated eight specific actions that he predicted would lead to a Japanese “mistake:” These were listed as:

A. Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the pacific, particularly Singapore.
B. Make an arrangement with Holland for use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.
D. Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
F. Keep the main strength of the US Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian islands.
G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.
H. Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.” [3]

Read the entire memo at the excellent Wikipedia pageon the subject.

Lt. Commander Arthur H. McCollum, author of Roosevelt's Japan provocation policy

Most of the recommended actions were basically provocation, signaling a U.S. encroachment on Japan’s emerging Pacific empire. The embargo would leave Japan strangulated and desperate, especially for oil, which the US had already embargoed in July. Basing talk would be seen as a threat of belligerence. But point “F” is particularly interesting; “keep the main strength of the US Fleet… in the vicinity of the Hawaiian islands.” They would then be within striking range of Japan, which is a two-way street - it would be seen by Japan as a real threat, and it would put the fleet in the range of pre-emptive strikes by Japan. It meant putting U.S. sailors in harm’s way, which was of course the key to the provocation working.

The plan was apparently premised on provoking Japan to carry out a well-known tactic of theirs. In 1905, Japan had found itself at war with Russia over disputes in the Pacific – Japan won the conflict by wiping out Russia’s weak naval forces at Port Arthur with a surprise naval raid before hostilities officially opened. It was underhanded but it worked, handing Japan the first victory of an Asian over a European power. Port Arthur signaled the rise of the “rising sun” which was at its zenith as McCollum wrote his eight points.

Stinnett explained the memo was that very evening forwarded to “two of Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisers.” FDR was apparently impressed with the memo, and the next day set to implementing the pivotal point “F.” This was his October 8 meeting with Admiral Richardson that led to the great falling out. After a year of such moves, as predicted, Japan decided to respond to the U.S. provocation policy with a Port Arthur-type surprise attack to cripple America’s navy a the outset. Top Japanese commanders felt this was the only way to survive war with the U.S., which by then seemed unavoidable.

Whatever the case regarding the old arguments - like the aircraft carriers - this memo proves that provoking and allowing the Japanese attack really was the plan. It has shifted the debate entirely, turning the old "smoking guns" into newly relevant supporting evidence. What's truly odd, therefore, is that shortly after 9/11 Stinnett stopped using the memo in his arguemtns, essentially gutting his own case and conceding the field to the 12/7 coverup apologists.

Sources:
[1] Stinnett, Robert B. “The Pearl Harbor Deception.” Presentation at the Independent Institute. December 2, 2002. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=127
[2] Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deciet: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York. Touchstone. 2000. bid. Stinnett. Page 8.
[2] Stinnett. Page 8.