TELEX AND TAPES, PART FOUR

THE FINAL WORD: 2001-2007
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
July 8 2009
incomplete

RESPONSIVE RECORDS
Apparently spurred by the Bamford/Nowicki revalations about recorded intercepts of the Liberty attack (as covered in part two), Judge A. Jay Cristol moved to have any such tapes declassified, He was probably confident they would show what he knew the IDF communications to show (as covered in part three) – the attackers had no idea they were attacking an American vessel, and all IDF parties missed the U.S. flag until well after they had stopped “screwing her.” Cristol filed a FOIA request with the National Security Agency (NSA) in April 2001 for release of any transmissions, on the day of the attack, to or from USS Liberty, USS Amberjack (submarine, long story), or the EC-121 everyone was talking about at the time. [1]

The judge gave them nearly two years before deciding the agency had “failed to comply” and he launched a lawsuit, via the U.S. District Court for Southern Florida, in January 2003. [2] This was sufficient to jar things loose; after a brief back-and-forth over details of the request, successful declassification was announced by the NSA’s Director of Policy on July 2 2003. Searches for the first two, anything from the ephemeral Amberjack or from spy ship Liberty (verified to be near the attack) revealed “no records responsive.” However the then-secret agency did manage to gather some intel from the plane, on tapes they still had around. These were declassified, and sent to Cristol in original audio and translated transcripts. [3] These amazing primary source materials arrived only after his book had been printed, but he was missing less than you might think - the 2003 release is far more noteworthy for what it doesn’t clarify than what it does.

THE CONTENTS: REALITY OR RITUAL?
The tapes are of voice communications, in Hebrew, and cover the time frame 1429 to 1519 local time. The start point of 2:29pm is about 15 minutes after the air attackers left, and six minutes before the MTBs fired their torpedoes. Thus it starts within “the attack” time span, and ends at 15:19, a few minutes after the flag was reported by the helicopters. The 50 minutes of audio between is only of talk between the “Super Frelon” helicopters and their IAF controllers at Hazor Airfield. These two birds were never involved in the attack and only arrived well after it was done to assess the situation and offer any help needed (opinions on the type of "help" intended differ). Most of the intercept is long, dull stretches of “are we there yet?” “Where are you?” “We’re over here” type chatter. Both audio (.wav) and transcripts (.pdf) are available for download here.

The tapes do show, on this limited level, an apparent confusion about the nationality of the crew, perhaps reflecting the back-and-forth between the "hunches" of some and the heedlessness of others. En route Hazor tells them the target is an Egyptian warship, and then and Egyptian supply ship. Then some doubt becomes evident just before they got on the scene; since there was supposedly “no flag on her!” it was to imperative to figure out where they came from. It was decided that only pulling survivors from the water or landing on the ship and interrogating them would do, and both options were discussed. English or Arabic were the specified languages to listen for. Someone was always wondering about "Americans," even though they supposedly had no reason to (see hunch link and part three) until after the flag was seen. But here it starts just before.

Upon arrival, the first helicopter reports the hull number again as “CTR-5” (which still meant "noting") and no visible flag, while the second apparently reported the American flag. This must occur somewhere a little before 15:12 (around 22:50 in the audio of tape 105). Although he’s present earlier describing the scene, and does seem to confirm with the controller after this, the pilot is not to be heard actually reporting a flag, on the audio or paper versions. Preceding the flag talk is at least two minutes of the controller talking one-way with no audible input from the helicopters. At 13:10:06 he warns the pilots to “watch out for the mast there,” which is where the flag should be seen. No response. Twenty seconds later he tells the lead pilot “take 810 with you, you’re both returning home.” Again no pilot response is heard. Thirty-six seconds later Hazor says, per the transcript:

13:12:03 Hazor: RGR, QSL, I understand.
13:12:08 Hazor: RGR, understand. Did you clearly identify an American flag?
13:12:13 Hazor: Thanks (Toda), stay over the area for now.
After an eight-second pause, the pilots finally pipe in, with the distinctive “choppy” chopper signal.
13:12:21 Pilot: [unknown statement, 3 sec, transcribed as “(CL)”]
13:12:31 Pilot: [unknown question, 1.5 sec, as “(CL)”]
13:12:36 Hazor: [answer, question, as “(CL)”]
13:12:40 Pilot: [short answer, not transcribed]
13:12:41 Hazor: They request that you make another pass and check once again whether it is really an American flag.
13:12:45 Pilot: RGR.

As on paper, the question in voce “did you clearly identify an American flag?” (22:59 in the wav audio) seems to come from nowhere. He was already aware that English might be spoken on the ship, and had seemingly heard nothing about such a sign, or anything at all, from the birds on the scene. Was he asking them to go ahead and verify the question scrawled on a napkin and slipped to him, after switching their channel back on? Sometimes these tapes sound more like ritual than reality.

RESPONSIVE REFLECTIONS
This release by NSA at the least failed to specifically contradict the IDF’s story that only the helicopter pilots spotted the flag. It supports it indirectly, in that the Hazor controller was certainly privy to no conclusive American ID, although he had the notion. However, the public had yet to see the rest of the recordings, the parts with the actual attack, during which the flag was also mentioned (according to the preponderance of American witnesses). Left hanging, different people drew different conclusions.

One side claimed, as they always have, that the issue was now closed. Judge Cristol told CNN in July "I don't think there's any question that anyone who reads these tapes would be absolutely convinced there was the fog of war out there […] I think this is probably the most important link in the evidence that ought to bring closure to this matter," Cristol said. [5] Somewhat more mildly, Israeli Embassy spokesman Mark Regev told CNN the tapes served as "further evidence that the Liberty incident was a terrible and tragic case of mistaken identity." [6] A July 9 Ha'aretz article, widely re-printed, was poorly titled "U.S. agency confirms sinking of USS Liberty was accident." [7]

Proof that it wasn’t fully sunk, Liberty survivor and early revisionist James Ennes, wrote in September that the ship’s crew “were pleased when we learned in June that apologists for our attackers had asked the federal courts to order the release of key intercept transcripts compiled during the attack.” He was confident that such tapes “would prove our case and disprove that of the apologists,” but “instead of releasing transcripts of the attack itself,” the NSA only put out tapes of the helicopters that “came afterward to clean up,” as he ambiguously describes their mission. [8]

Ennes finds that “nothing in the documents released suggests that [the attack] was an accident.” [9] To be fair, the tapes do show apparent confusion vis-a-vis the ship’s nationality, and other IDF records generally line up on the same confusion, with Soviet thrown into the mix at least at one point. [10] To me it’s exactly this confusion that makes no sense, given the broad sweep of ignorance required, making it less “fog of war” than “super-dense thunderhead of war.” Far more blinding, that, but it requires special conditions to form.

Even accepting the confusion in these tapes as genuine, characterizing it as proving the accidental attack theory is both misleading and common. “To our astonishment,” Ennes wrote, perhaps sarcastically, “the pro-Israel PR team put their own false spin on what was released. […] This false account was […] repeated as established fact - often with quotes from Chief Apologist A. Jay Cristol, proclaiming victory.” [11] A Baltimore Sun article from July 16 published some Cristol’s triumphant proclamations:

“[Cristol] says the recordings support his conclusion that the Israeli attackers had no idea they were targeting a U.S. vessel. […] "these tapes contain nothing showing that the attack was deliberate […] to me at least, they show it was a mistake […] nothing more of significance [remains] to be found. I think it will settle the matter for all but that 2 percent of die-hard conspiracy theorists.”” [12]

I suspect his math is wrong here on the numbers who would refuse to be distracted, it’s true that the “die-hards” (they survived rockets, napalm, torpedoes) were among them. So was Steve Forslund, who responded to these “only and final "tapes" that the NSA has released” in his statement to the Liberty Survivors' Assn. “Parties state that these are the only tapes of intercepts that exist. That may very well be true, now.” [13] But he apparently remains as steadfast as ever that the actual attack traffic was intercepted, transcribed in English and printed at his station at Offutt AFB, and showed an assault proceeding despite flag reports and pilot protests (see part one). The Agency disagrees.

UNDER THE BUS
The chief NSA linguist aboard the EC-121 in question, Marvin Nowicki, had to be disappointed. Like Forslund and others, he felt the transmissions he captured were of the attack and featured the stars and stripes. In his version, of course, this stops the attack. Judging by his past advocacy for release of the exculpatory recordings he remembered, Nowicki likely did something about this snub, quietly and respectfully. But there would be no more; in early June of 2007 the NSA “finalized the review of all material relative to the 08 June 1967 attack on the USS Liberty. This additional release adds to the collection of documents and audio recordings and transcripts previously posted to the site on 02 July 2003.” What was added was fairly minor, and included no additional intercepts. Again, they clearly affirmed that all they got was "voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots [...] following the attack on the Liberty." "No communications were available [...] that might reflect the attack or reaction," they regretted to inform the pubic. [14] that June 8, the exact 40th anniversary of the attack, was selected for this statement served to amplify the deliberate finality of it.

The telex witnesses of part one, and Nowicki and his teammate all maintained the tapes “reflected the attack” quite clearly, as well as the U.S. flag. The NSA acknowledges only recordings that mention the ensign but well after the attack. This is noteworthy in that it offers a plausible explanation – all these men simply heard this helicopter talk and read in that the helicopters were involved in a vicious attack. For comparison, the man who captured these signals for the NSA has said:

“For the record, we (my teammate and I) both heard and recorded the references to the U.S. flag made by the pilots and captains of the motor torpedo boats.” [15] “[O]nly later in the afternoon did we hear references to [the] flag during the attacks.” [16] ”As I recall, we recorded most, if not all, of the attack.” [17]

There is little in these distinctive helicopter communications about seeing a ship and flying survivors to shore that could be construed as a two-phase air-sea attack being either carried out or called off. Nonetheless, many rational people will now conclude, however odd such a widespread embellishment seems, that they simply must have been confused.

So, Nowicki’s last chance had come and gone; the NSA decided everything it recorded can be released publicly, and his tapes weren’t on this last bus either. To mix metaphors, he was in fact left beneath this last bus as it rolled away into the night over his previous credibility. His tapes were never to return, obliviated down the memory hole. There’s been no comment since then, but his teammate – named as Michael Prostinak - was interviewed after this final thud, and told Chicago Tribune’s John Crewdson "I can tell you there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet," he said, referring to the NSA’s 2003 releases. "No doubt in my mind, more than three tapes." After inspecting these, “Prostinak said it was clear from the sequence in which they were numbered that at least two tapes that had once existed were not there.” These other tapes, unlike those released, contained clear language indicating an attack; Prostinak told Crewdson the people he heard “were not just tranquil or taking care of business as normal. We knew that something was being attacked." [18]

The agency disagrees.

rest coming...

FALSE-FLAGGING IRAQ? {MASTERLIST}

Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 26 2009

Main Incident: September 19 2005 - arrest of Britons accused of terrorist plans
Other Alleged Incidents: Various times from invasion in 2003 to present
Alleged provocateurs: Military forces of United States and United Kingdom, perhaps Israel
Casualties: Unknown
Outcome: Varied
Investigations: A bit fishy

I’ve been in a bit of a time-warp this year, looking to the past with its protective shield of years and of secrets already revealed. Suspicious events in the present are by comparison more threatening, playing out quite directly in the now – I started out my research into false-flag operations and such with current events and questions about September 11 – After my long awkward dance with “9/11 Truth” I don’t feel like trying to re-approach that pivot, but rather the period just this side of it, the resultant War on Terror/World War IV/Long War/War of Many Names era.

The most visible battleground for this so far has been the cities of Iraq, out of which have emerged allegations of - and perhaps evidence for –Coalition forces using false flag terrorist attacks blamed on insurgents. This would apparently be intended to help keep occupied Iraq just that way. There are questions all along about motives and evidence, and I’m just on the outer edge of the fray. Since I’m not afraid of finding nothing awry – I hope not to in this case – I’ll look at it as an alleged pattern worthy of examination. This post will organize others exploring charges allegations and evidence. Primarly I’m looking at issues surrounding the 9/19 2005 incident involving the British army and Basra police, but will explore other avenues as well.

The Posts:
9/19 Basic Gist and Graphics

9/19 The First Half: The Arrest

On the Soldiers' Mission

ON THE MISSION OF THE 9/19 SOLDIERS

HE WHO DARES WHAT?
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
[False-Flagging Iraq series]
June 25 2009
incomplete

When two British Special Forces soldiers were arrested in Basra on September 19 2005, many questions were raised. Among the most important is the nature of the mission they were on that brought them into violent confrontation with their erstwhile allies, the local police, and in turn brought the local British forces smashing through the police and the local "lynch mob" to get them back, killing around a dozen Iraqis along the way. This had better be good...

We know the two men were (believed to be) part of the UK Army Special Air Service (SAS), an elite force famous for bold raids behind enemy lines and operating under the motto “Who Dares, Wins.” If so, what were they daring to do on this day? A Basra official, Mohammed al-Abadi, complained the soldiers “refused to say what their mission was and suggested that we ask their commander.” [1] To my knowledge, they never got an answer from above either. Different solutions to the riddle have been offered in the days afterwards, before the issue went into longtime hibernation mode. Below I’ll explore the four broad categories of theory.

1) False-Flagging Basra
The first category was the first we heard in detail - those peculiar locals saw the darkest version, that the SAS men were involved in false flag terrorism. Those with known grudges were the most vocal; Sheik Hassan al-Zarqani, a spokesman for rebel leader Moqtada al-Sadr, issued a press release saying “we believe these soldiers were planning an attack on a market or other civilian targets,” that this attack was to be a car-bombing, that they were “disguised as members of the Mehdi Army” (Sadr’s own group), and that the police refused to release the imposters since “they were considered to be planning terrorist attacks.” [2]

Many others far from the fray have concluded – or alluded to - the same; one critic called it “a clear instance of a foreign power attempting to fabricate a terrorist attack. Why else would the soldiers be dressed as Arabs if not to frame them? Why have a car laden with explosives if you don't plan to use them for destructive purposes?” [3] There are of course other reasons to dress like someone besides framing them, and other reasons – if few – for driving an explosive car. There’s no direct evidence I’m aware of for a booby-trapped car. There IS evidence of people stating this as fact, and for same people already believing the Coalition was behind the public bombings (this “previous reports confirm” or “prior-bias weakens” question will get its own post later).

There may have been a bomb as “reported” after all, with the evidence hushed-up afterwards, but I’m leaning the other way – the later lack of clues reveals the first reports were probably just opinionated propaganda. These reports being false doesn’t rule out some other planned provocation, which they were armed enough for, but absent a bomb there’s less reason to suspect such. Therefore, this case as I understand it does little to directly support the coalition false-flag theory.

2) Routine Intelligence Work
The UK Telegraph reported initially “the SAS men are thought to have been on a close observation patrol when they were stopped at a checkpoint.” The same piece explains how “soldiers have been told not to stop if challenged while working under-cover, as insurgents often masquerade as police officers.” [4] It would seem unlikely they were told to shoot while not stopping, although it seems that’s what they did. It makes perfect sense however that soldiers decked out as militants should not stop for possible militants disguised as police – especially since they’d already shot one of the real, militia-sympathizing Basra police officers.

Another paper, The Scotsman reported that “that the soldiers were part of an "undercover special forces detachment" in Basra to "bridge the intelligence void” and “gather human intelligence during counter-terrorist missions."” [5] One diplomat told the Guardian "We explained clearly to the authorities that they were British forces on a run-of-the mill observation mission." [6] Of course to observe out in the world It helps to blend in, hence the wigs and gauzy stuff; light-skinned as they were, Chechens might have been a good cover. Then they just panicked and started shooting at militia-police.

These are all boring missions that hardly seem worthy of such a cloak and dagger moment as 9/19. Sometimes however reality is just that – the boring choice. That hasn’t kept some from offering some enhanced versions…

3) Special Missions That Make Neat Political Points
Other sources narrow down the intelligence mission to Investigating a police-militia link, police corruption, torture, cat mutilations, and other such evils. The Herald: “Sources say the British soldiers […] were looking at infiltration of the city’s police by the followers of the outspoken Shi’ite cleric, Moqtada al Sadr.” [7] The Times, September 21: “The two soldiers are believed to have been investigating a corrupt police unit in Basra who were colluding with Shia militia leaders. Some of the men who later interrogated them are believed to be part of this same unit.” [8] Indeed, their mission proved spectacularly successful in flushing out such links, even though it seems to have gone terribly awry to do so.

In October, the Telegraph reported they finally “can reveal […] the real story,” which was that the soldiers were “spying on a senior police commander who was torturing prisoners with an electric drill.” That's certainly horrifying, and the paper described their mission as investigating “who was behind the reign of terror" at the very jail they wound up inside of. Brigadier John Lorimer, the man who oversaw the soldiers’ controversial rescue, told the paper the jail he ordered smashed down was a “very nasty place.” [9] A good way to find out what happens in the jail is to go inside it, but this was apparently not the plan, or else the costly rescue mission would not be called in to stop the process.

Another story with broader political implications and some detail to support it, was stopping roadside bombs coming in from Iran. The Sunday Times reported on the 25th, just four days after revealing their militia-police-corruption mission, that the soldiers were really “engaged in a “secret war” against insurgents bringing sophisticated bombs into the country from Iran.” [10] The deadly new bombs were made in a known Iranian style, meaning they must be from Iran. Therefore, “a 24-strong SAS team has been working out of Basra to provide a safety net to stop the bombers getting into the city from Iran,” said one source. “The aim is to identify routes used by insurgents and either capture or kill them.” [11] This system involved remote surveillance by human and electronic sensors along the routes into Basra. The Times graphic does show them headed towards the desert outside of town. “A source” also told the Times the pair was en route to another patrol to bring them “more tools and fire power” (which might explain their overabundance of weaponry) and to stop and do some surveillance, sort of along the way. [12]

Or perhaps their real mission, concealed by these more mundane stories, is the case made by the News Herlad Review on the 23rd that these “brave soldiers” were looking for the missing Weapons of Mass Destruction the war was first based on, and in the process:

“searching for clues of a suspected axis between Saddam Hussein’s regime, Al Qaeda in Iraq and elsewhere, corrupt police, Iranians, North Koreans, and Satan himself. Sources say the men were startlingly close to finding the missing link. when the devil’s minions closed in and took them to the local prison, which is believed to house one of the portals to Hell used to communicate master plans.” [13]

4) None of the Above
For my money, I’m going with “none of the above/undecided.” Of course any of the non-sinister mission types given above, could very well have caused the initial arrest situation, if natural mistrust and anxiety, perhaps some sloppiness, or simple bad luck enter the picture. However, given their hanging around police facilities and openness with firearms, it seems quite possible they were supposed to be arrested - like a dye marker injected into a system to gauge how it works.

My own hunch, or interesting hypothesis anyway, is that the mission these men were on was something involving competing interests, power and leverage, and an acutely uncertain level of trust. The trust of course failed badly however you slice it, which brings me to a point made by Micheal Keefer, writing for the Center for Research on Globalization:

"To remove these men from any danger of interrogation by their own supposed allies in the government the British are propping up […] tends, if anything, to support the view that this episode involved something much darker and more serious than a mere flare-up of bad tempers at a check-point." [14]

Hardly anyone would disagree there was more to it than that; it’s the origins of the ominous intentions over which opinions differ. I’m seeing at least some darkness on both sides, if more acutely within the Basra police; in fact I feel queasy thinking of all the others passing through their hands without an armored division being sent to fetch them back. And that’s even without believing the drill torture stories.

The abuse allegations and other political points above – police-militia-Iran links - were also floated on this story’s current whether or not that was an original reason. In particular the charges of militia sympathies and cooperation were well-proven by the incident, as it was reported. Of course the strangely blatant murder of a militia-police-link-reporting journalist by militia-police-link-assassins the very same day sure didn’t help. [15] Who decided the timing on that? The earlier murder of militia-police-link-reporter Steven Vincent had already set the trend in August. [16] The British army’s later destruction in late 2006 of another Basra jail - by bombs – exposed torture and inhumane conditions inside, strengthening the narrative further. [17] But the case of 9/19 above all, involving such a stark contrast between “allies” as well as a man on fire, is what brought to a head in the British mind the hopeless depths of Basra’s wickedness and thence to the plans for withdrawal.

If those two guys being on some alleged psychological operation doesn’t seem to make sense, it’s worth asking if the normal rules really apply in this case. The original suspicions of bombing had the intent of retaining control through fake terror – Gladio in Mesopotamia. In the end what happened served brilliantly to tilt the scale towards the British relinquishing responsibility for the south of Iraq. And it may even have been intended that way. If you’re going to leave anyway, why not make a few points towards your myth of “why we gave up in Iraq” on your departure?
---
Sources:
[1, 4] Blomfield, Adrian and Thomas Harding “Troops free SAS men from jail.” The Telegraph. September 20 2005.
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/09/20/wirq20.xml
[2, 14] Keefer, Michael. "Were British Special Forces Soldiers Planting Bombs in Basra? Suspicions Strengthened by Earlier Reports." Center for Research on Globalization. September 25 2005. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=994
[3] Hutaff, Matt. “Fake Terrorism Is a Coalition's Best Friend.” The Simon. September 20 2005. www.thesimon.com/magazine/articles/canon_fodder/0961_fake_terrorism_coalition_best_friend.html
[5] Ahmed, Nafeez. “Caught red-handed: British Undercover Operatives in Iraq. Zarqawi, eat your heart out.” The Raw Story. September 23 2005. http://rawstory.com/news/2005/CAUGHT_RED__0923.html
[6] Mansour, Osama and Michael Howard. "Britain refuses apology and compensation for Iraqis caught up in Basra riots." The Guardian. September 26 2005. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/26/military.iraq
[7] Nimmo, Kurt. “British “Pseudo-Gang” Terrorists Exposed in Basra.” Another Day in the Empire. September 20 2005. http://www.uruknet.info/?p=15936
[8] McGrory, Daniel. “Police station raid was diversion as SAS squad rescued comrades.” The Sunday Times. September 21 2005.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article568898.ece
[9] Rayment, Sean. “Captured SAS men 'spying on drill torturer.'”The Telegraph. October 16 2005. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1500740/Captured-SAS-men-spying-on-drill-torturer.html
[10, 11, 12] Smith, Michael and Ali Rifat. “SAS in secret war against Iranian agents.” The Sunday Times. September 25, 2005.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article570571.ece
[13] Don’t be silly; of course I made it up. But it does seem to fit the pattern, doesn’t it?
[15] Knickmeyer, Elen and Jonathan Finer. “British Smash Into Iraqi Jail To Free 2 Detained Soldiers.” Washington Post Foreign Service. Tuesday, September 20, 2005; Page A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/19/AR2005091900572.html?nav=rss_world
[16] Worth, Robert F. “Reporter Working for Times Abducted and Slain in Iraq .” New York Times. September 20 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/20/international/middleeast/20basra.html
[17] Santora, Marc. “British Soldiers Storm Iraqi Jail, Citing Torture.” New York Times. December 26 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/world/middleeast/26iraq.html

TELEX AND TAPES, PART THREE

SESSIONS WITH THE IDF TAPES
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
[USS Liberty series]
First posted June 20 2009
Major re-write 7/12/09

Note: This article has been re-written since my original copy of the Jerusalem Post transcript was fraudulent I had previously made a central point of discrepancies between this and Cristol’s version, but the actual article from its original source does not have the same differences. The altered re-post and its contradictory implications are covered at another post now.

A JUDGE AND A JOURNALIST
As parts one and two covered, memories from the American side of the event have perhaps exclusively stated the air attack on the Liberty revealed reports of the American flag flying over the ship. Some cite the attack commencing despite this, some called off due to it. I’ve mentioned how Israeli military sources insist this was not the case at all, with no mention of the flag until well after both the air attack and torpedo assault were finished. The American claims are based on intercepts passed through Air Force intelligence channels, but no one has been able to show a recording or transcript to back up their memories. The Israelis, on the other hand, have produced both recordings and transcripts of (at least part of) the attack.

The tapes they’ve got are apparently normal procedural recordings of conversations between air units and their ground controllers. For decades these were held tightly in military circles, used in official investigations, sometimes quoted in these reports, and therefore present as hints in other works. Accident advocate Aharon Jay Cristol (a Florida judge) explains how England’s Thames TV produced a documentary in 1986, first talking with the survivors, then speaking with IDF personnel, expecting the standard “no comment.” Instead, a few there, including Lt. Col. Matti Greenberg, achieved a PR coup by sharing some of their records, including “transcriptions and translations of audiotape of the attack.” This decision, as Cristol writes, unexpectedly changed the whole approach of the film from critical over to neutral-leaning-to-accident. [Cristol pp 175-76]

A select few people outside the military loop have been allowed to actually hear the tapes, as well as getting transcripts. Judge Cristol was among these, sitting in on a June 1990 session that included several Hebrew linguists and original air controllers. He repeated the privilege on September 7 2001, in a similar session. He published his transcript and notes in 2002 as appendix 2 in The Liberty Incident [pp 209-223]. The tape he listened to ran nearly eight hours, from 13:43 until 21:30, with the last entry dealing with the Liberty at 18:57. I’ll cover the details of what it says below.

By the time Cristol’s version was published, James Bamford had re-invigorated the controversy with new evidence in Body of Secrets, released in 2001. Bamford’s charges that the flag was seen and the attack continued anyway snowballed over the following years, and the IDF again looked for a coup, offering paper copies and a listen to Jerusalem Post writer Arieh O’Sullivan. His article featuring another much shorter version of the transcript was published in the Post in June 2004. (full re-post here) It was accompanied by supporting thoughts and a controversial interview with lead attack pilot Yiftah Specter, in which he accused the survivors of (perhaps) being anti-Semitic, and being pretty dishonest considering they should be dead.

This widely-read version only runs from 13:50 up to 14:14 and the calling-off of the air attack. The transcript was compiled in this case anyway from two tapes, one air-to-ground (pilots and controllers), and the other ground-to-ground (chief and regional air controllers). The audiotapes themselves were not released,” he wrote, but only “a mix of the two tapes into one transcript, which explains the time overlaps.”

For reference, the parties on the tapes are chief air controllers at Air Control South, Air Control Central, and at General HQ in Tel Aviv (“Menachem,” “Robert,” and “Kislev”) Other regular players include deputies for these men and the attacking forces; lead Mirage jets commanded by Specter and code-named “Kursa,” and the second wave napalm-carrying jets designated “Royal.” A planned third wave with iron bombs is oddly tagged “Nixon,” mentioned but not in the discussion. The Motor Torpedo Boats are even represented with one boat in communication with Kursa – this shows as “Migdal” in the transcript.

Between all these, in twenty-four minutes, there is no mention of a flag, except in the negative (no flag reported at attack's end). There is a peculiarly high number of random mentions of the word “American” or “Americans,’ but these could not have been triggered by flag reports unless those came in on another line or were edited out.

WHAT IS THIS ABOUT AMERICANS?
The first of these pops out of nowhere at 13:54, about two minutes before the shooting started, when weapons system officer Lazar Karni (L.K.) injects as his only line “what is this, Americans?” This is fairly well agreed on by both transcripts for time and content. As I wrote earlier, with no flag in sight, O’Sullivan explains this was “a hunch”, and Cristol cites the man’s testimony as making a valid logic point worthy of blurting and then of being “immediately retracted.” The “American” lines following this begin immediately:

Time	Cristol	O’Sullivan
1354	L.K.: What is that? Americans?	LK What is this? Americans?
	Shimon: What Americans?	Shimon: Where are Americans?
	Kislev: Robert, what did you say?	KISLEV Robert, what are you saying?
	[No one answers]	(quickly disregarding the comment, Kislev moves on)

O’Sullivan noted how at some point “suddenly, in the middle of the attack, an unknown voice cuts in from the side: "What is this? What about the Americans?" The similar line attributed to “Shimon” is neither unknown nor “in the middle of the attack.” Was this line left out of the paper version? 

We know that not every transmission was heard; at 1400 and 1401 at least Cristol notes (presumably mundane) transmissions from Royal flight missed or blocked and not present in the audio. Others were left out due to being on the non-included channel 19; right before the 1357 mark “Shimon” asks “Robert” to have Royal call in on channel 19. The conversation they have is not included in the tapes or transcripts. Cristol noted: “At this time Royal […] is arguing with his controller about the fact that he is carrying napalm, not iron bombs.” [p 213] It’s not clear how he knows that’s what the argument was about – but I already noted no flag reports unless they were on another line. And here is just such a moment, about a minute into the air attack when the pilots first got up close.

F----D BY THE NAVY
The next point of interest is where the Post version ends, with a slight time offset between the two versions and a slight translation difference as well but no substantial disagreement.

Time	Cristol	O’Sullivan
1413	Menachem: Kislev, what country?	X[later]X
	Kislev: Possibly American	X[later]X
1414	X[no 1414]X	MENACHEM: Kislev, what country?
	X[no 1414]X	KISLEV: Apparently American
1415	Shimon: Kislev, maybe you know which countries are around here. …	X[ends 1414]X

 

This itself is an odd statement, as no one is supposed to have reported a flag, nor to have understood the hull number to be anything other than non-Arab (or an Arab ruse?). Some discrepancy in tape mixing or transcription is most likely reason for the one-minute maximum time difference, but Cristol’s 14:14 slot being empty could suggest no dialogue there, for at least a minute, and certainly no shouting. This is interesting because a later slot cryptically refers to someone’s "theory” I’m now curious about:

1439
Unknownn: Robert, did you hear my theory? Just when the navy saw we’re getting them off, they began shouting.
1440
Robert: Kiselv shouted “Americans.” [It was Kislev at 1414]. [220]

The brackets are Cristol’s notes – it would seem likely he’s referring to the earlier “possibly” line and this means nothing but citing the wrong minute. It may also be a case of the transcripts not matching the tapes he heard. The 1413 line was apparently not a shout, but witnesses told Cristol that shortly after hearing the hull number at 1412, Kislev had blurted out “damnit! The navy has f---ed us again.” [p 47] This line is definitely not in either transcript, so perhaps his shout included both this and the word “Americans.”

At any rate, Cristol notes “Kislev remembers that, at 1412, he concluded that the target of Kursa and Royal Flights was American. It is clear, however, from the recordings that during the remainder of that afternoon, as the tragedy was unfolding and he was listening to the radio traffic on his headset, he changed his mind several times, still thinking that the ship might be Egyptian.” [p 47] Indeed, as the torpedo boats re-identified and attacked the Liberty at 14:35 and machine gunned it for some minutes after, Kislev was apparently done with shouting about the damn navy fucking them over the American ID. My own impression is he seems unconvinced, but going with the flow as “Robert” and “Shimon” at Air Control central lead them all back to Egyptian ID, which isn’t fully abandoned for another half-hour, until it’s quite clear the navy had failed to sink it anyway.

MISSING PARTS?
That the transcripts are incomplete relative to the tapes may be taken to indicate the tapes themselves are complete and unaltered. There’s nothing in there proving that at all, and the fact that they contain none of the flag reports mentioned by American listeners is evidence in fact that they aren’t complete. One of the attack-the-flag transcript witnesses commented on O’Sullivan’s version "There is simply no way that [is] the same as what I saw. […] The fact that the Israeli pilots clearly identified the ship as American and asked for further instructions from ground control appears to be a missing part of that Jerusalem Post article." [Crewdson]

Taking his source seriously, John Crewdson wrote in his Chicago Tribune article how O’Sullivan “said the Israeli Air Force tapes he listened to contained blank spaces,” and that “he assumed those blank spaces occurred while Israeli pilots were conducting their strafing runs and had nothing to communicate.” [Crewdson] Perhaps this was an unjustified assumption, but to be fair, O’Sullivan also had the advantage of hearing the gaps. But then, realistic gaps can be created in a professional remix operation. What to conclude?

---
Sources:
- Cristol, A. Jay. The Liberty Incident” The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Brassey's Inc. 2002.
- O’Sullivan, Arieh. “Liberty Revisited: The Attack." Jerusalem Post. June 4, 2004. Features, page 20. Verified by JPost archive, 7/11/09.
- Crewdson, John. "New revelations in attack on American spy ship." Chicago Tribune. October 2 2007. (Additional material published Dec 2). Page 4. http://www.chicagotribune.com/services/newspaper/printedition/tuesday/chi-liberty_tuesoct02,0,1050179.story?page=4

9/19 BASIC GIST AND GRAPHICS

Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 18 2009


For quick reference, I present a post based entirely on an informative graphic published by the Times online about the "SAS rescue" of September 19 2005. First, my own maps I created based on theirs and satellite imagery, and then a timeline of the events marked on their map. This will serve as a basic run-down of the battle of the police station, from the British official perspective. It's the only one I've seen yet that offers times for much of anything, so Ive been using it as a source. My respects to its creators.

Above: Greater Basra, with British HQ locations, initial arrest, and later rescue locations indicated. (right-click, new window for larger view). Below: detail of the prison area and militia house the soldiers were rescued from.


THE RESCUE
Early on Monday Two British undercover soldiers are stopped at a checkpoint and arrested by the police.
10:40 Monday The soldiers put out an emergency call to say that they are in trouble. Troops are dispatched to assist them.
15:15 Cordon put into place around police station
16:30 Mob gathers, petrol bombs are thrown and two Warrior armored personnel carriers set on fire
19:26 More violence Known agitators seen leading another mob towards police station
20:50 Intelligence revealed that the soldiers have been moved away from the police station.
21:00 Decision is taken to attack the police compound and search for the two men
22:00 Force detached to search nearby villa. They force entry and, after a gunfight, rescue the soldiers.
0200 Yesterday Operation complete. Two freed prisoners flown to Baghdad for debriefing and three British soldiers treated for injuries.

9/19, THE FIRST HALF: THE ARREST

WHAT THE BASRA POLICE DISCOVERED
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 17 2009

IN CUSTODY: A MURKY BEGINNING
In charge of security for the mostly-Shiite southern city of Basra, the British military enjoyed a generally placid command relative to, say, the Sunni triangle. Relations started worsening, however, in autumn of 2005, starting with three British soldiers killed in the first weeks of September. Several coalition arrests of prominent spiritual leaders on the 18th increased tensions, spurring protests and possibly further problems. The burden was shared, thankfully, with the Coalition’s Iraqi partners in peace and stability, like the Basra police force, who were also on guard as the morning of Monday, September 19 2005 drew up over them.

Accounts differ or are vague on almost all details about the events of that morning, starting at a time I’ve seen best narrowed down to “before dawn.” [1] The troubles began with two occupants of a well-used white car, similar to a later model Toyota Cressida. The car’s direction of travel is not clear from available sources, nor the location of this crossing-of-paths; it’s alternately been described as a police station or a police checkpoint. We do know that the two men inside sported traditional gauzy Arab shirts, short beards, curly black hair and some kind of head scarves, in an unspecified style. Of course these were disguises; they were really British Special Forces soldiers, generally reported as SAS, doing something undercover.

Accounts and reports differ on just what happened between the soldiers and the police attempting to halt them. It’s agreed by all that the men in the car fired shots at the police, but all other details remain murky. The first reports from Iraqi authorities were that at least two people had been shot, one fatally and one not. Later reports, for the most part, repeated these. Whether both were police or one civilian, and if so which was killed - variations have been reported. BBC's first is typical; the charge was "allegedly shooting dead a policeman and wounding another." [2]

About a week after the incident, “Iraqi police involved in their arrest” gave a Sydney Morning Herald reporter “detailed accounts of last Monday's events.” The article itself is a gratuitously slanted piece, taking every chance to imply that one of the thousand lurid Arab evils permeating the Basra system had to exculpate the Brits entirely (see below). Nonetheless, it cites:

Captain Ahmed al-Shimari, who was on duty last Monday, said the soldiers had been spotted taking photographs from a car. Three officers, Fadil Hadi, Allah al-Bazuni and Qutayba Sa'ami, ran towards the car. Mr Hadi fired two warning shots and the soldiers returned fire, hitting Mr Sa'ami in the leg. [3]

According to this version, that was the only injury caused by the soldiers. All reports of a death were errors – or worse – from hostile local officials. But whatever the details, somehow the two men were apprehended alive and taken to the local police station for questioning. By then it was discovered that under their terrorist-like garb the men were quite Caucasian – Chechens? One Basra official said “they refused to say what their mission was and suggested that we ask their commander.” [4] The closest they had to identification on them said the same thing – laminated cards saying "In an emergency, please call US and UK forces,” providing different phone numbers for Basra and two other cities in southern Iraq. [5]

A graphic provided by Times Online (London) indicates it wasn’t until 10:40 am – apparently with their “one phone call” – that the soldiers put in an emergency call to headquarters. [6] Soon British forces were talking with the Basra police captains and local officials; they acknowledged the two as their own, and negotiations for their release began, as a military detachment was assembled to back up their bargaining position.

In the meantime, the two were held at the jail compound in southwest Basra, about midway between British military HQ and the Coldstream Guards HQ. In a room with yellow chipped-paint walls they sat hands-bound on an ugly “granite look” aggregate floor, as Arab news cameramen were allowed in to film them (see images above). [7] The two men were apparently beaten or injured in capture, though not badly, sporting bandaged heads. I would presume the blood staining the lighter haired guy’s pants is his own. Note the darker-haired guy has a black scarf around his neck; in later shots this is removed and he’s clearly been doused with water. Both carry an air of defiance, a thin smirk of nonchalance. I think they look pretty scared.

WEAPONS: STANDARD OR MASS DESTRUCTION?
Also on display was their confiscated tool kit, including among a car jack, various rucksacks and plastic cases, BBC’s Reporter Richard Galpin acknowledged “assault rifles, a light machine gun, an anti-tank weapon, radio gear and medical kit.” Speaking with British forces, Galpin passed on that “this is thought to be standard kit for the SAS operating in such a theatre of operations.” [8] I'm not sure if that's ridiculous or not, but it seems a bit much for what a British diplomat in Basra told the authorities was "a run-of-the mill observation mission." [9] But hey, you never know when you'll run into an Al Qaeda tank.


Top: whole cache as shown by basra police. Middle right: shirts and wigs the soldiers used for disguise. Rest: close-ups of weapons. Right-click, new window for larger views.

There is little disagreement over the above weaponry, but the most important variable for understanding what happened that day, and what the police were thinking, is the possibility that the car was rigged with heavy explosives. Official British and friendly sources only acknowledge this has been reported. China’s Xinhua news agency reported on the 19th, citing an unnamed source at the Iraqi Interior ministry (which oversees the police), “the two soldiers were using a civilian car packed with explosives.” [10] Fattah al-Shaykh, member of the Iraqi National Assembly, told Al Jazeera as the crisis began of the “booby-trapped car laden with ammunition [that] was meant to explode in the centre of the city of Basra in the popular market.” [11]

Sheik Hassan al-Zarqani, a spokesperson for Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr, quickly issued a press release telling the world "what our police found in their car was very disturbing — weapons, explosives and a remote control detonator […] These are the weapons of terrorists. We believe these soldiers were planning an attack on a market or other civilian targets, and thanks be to God they were stopped and countless lives were saved." Zarqani further alleged the disguise the men affected had been of Sadr’s militia, the Medhi (Mahdi) Army, and that they were to bear the blame for the planned bombing. [12] Zarqani’s release also addressed the British demands for the bombers’ release: “The police refused as they were considered to be planning terrorist attacks, and as they were disguised as members of the Mehdi Army, the police wanted to know who their target was.” [13]

Many readers will deny these sources out-of-hand, and they do seem to have an untrustworthy bias-to-information ratio. I’m not so sure what the police or courts there said about the alleged bomb, and on what evidence. There are no photos or video taken of a bomb. One photograph connected by one researcher to this story [below] shows the car cordoned off by military vehicles as if it were dangerous itself. This photo was posted by researcher Sara Meyer shortly after the events, and I can’t find another source. It was coupled with an explanation, un-sourced, how the car “was later removed by the British.” [14]


TO MAKE BAIL OR BREAK JAIL?
There was at the time little to clarify what was the intent of the SAS men – “they refused to say what their mission was” and their commanders weren’t adding much. Similar but more open disagreement surrounds the intent of the police. They claimed to be holding suspicious men engaged in violent criminal behavior, and that fits a lot of the facts. However by parading cameras by them and such, one may sense a little more enthusiasm than simply protecting public safety would explain. The British military took the view – and quite firmly – that the Basra police force was infiltrated by anti-coalition militia sympathizers. Among the charges, the Sydney Morning Herald’s article named Police Captain Yasser al-Bahadli, “a known Mahdi Army sympathizer” as the overseer of the men’s captivity. [15] Their stated belief was thus that their soldiers were in grave danger of falling into enemy hands and must be released.

This concern could of course conceal some other motive for demanding their release, but whatever the case, the Ministry of Defense explained to home audiences how a seven-person military legal team had been dispatched to the prison to try and work things out that way. [16] Preparation for a larger extra-legal military effort were also set in motion. One diplomat, Karen McLuskie, told the Guardian "we explained clearly to the authorities that they were British forces on a run-of-the mill observation mission." [17] Certainly along the way they reminded their colleagues that “under Iraqi law,” as the BBC reported, “the soldiers should have been handed over to coalition authorities.” [18] The Brits pulled strings with the national government in Baghdad and reportedly got the Interior ministry, responsible for police, to issue an order for their Basra people to release the men. It would seem that this order was ignored by the involved locals.

Probably around this time, Brigadier John Lorimer "had good reason to believe that the lives of the soldiers were at risk,” as he told the BBC, and he decided to get “near the police station to help ensure their safety by providing a cordon.” [19] By a quarter after three a small force under Lorimer’s command was at the scene, and a security cordon established around the compound. [20].

In the meantime, anger in the streets had grown, based on whatever people had heard about the soldiers at the jail. It’s difficult to say if the reportedly slain officer, or the planned bombing, or simply the attempts of the British to circumvent Basra justice, was most paramount in anyone’s mind. The Independent reported “one witness said Iraqis were driving through the streets with loudhailers demanding that the soldiers should be kept in the police station, and then jailed.” [21] But some potent combination of factors mobilized dozens – then hundreds - to the jail for a spontaneous citizen’s assembly (or militia-sponsored mob, depending which side of Operation Iraqi Freedom you’re on). The villain Captain Yasser al-Bahadli, watched as the British tanks and roiling crowd gathered ouside the station, the Herald’s article reports, and “put out word two "Israelis" had been arrested - certain death had the mob reached them.” [22]

Despite all this, the authorities behaved as if all was under control and proceeding normally - A provincial council spokesman for Basra, Nnadhim al-Jabari, announced that the two captured soldiers “were likely to go before an Iraqi court,” the Independent reported. [23] But al-Jabari didn’t have all the facts; as it turns out, the suspects would not go in front of the judge. Eventually they went home, but where exactly they went in the following hours is of great interest and some mystery.
---
Sources:
[1, 4, 7, 21, 23] McCormack, Helen. "The day that Iraqi anger exploded in the face of the British occupiers." The Independent. September 20, 2005. http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0920-05.htm
[2, 8, 16] BBC news. "Iraq probe into soldier incident." 20 September 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4264614.stm
[3, 15, 22] Rayment, Sean with special sorrespondents. “Britons had visions of their throats being cut.” Sydney Morning Herald. September 26 2005. http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/britons-had-visions-of-their-throats-being-cut/2005/09/25/1127586747136.html
[5, 9, 17] Mansour, Osama and Michael Howard. "Britain refuses apology and compensation for Iraqis caught up in Basra riots." The Guardian. September 26 2005. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/26/military.iraq
[6, 20] http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1790311,00.html
[10] Xinhuanet. "Iraqi police detain two British soldiers in Basra." September 19 2005. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-09/19/content_3514065.htm
[11] Chossudovsky, Michel. “British "Undercover Soldiers" Caught driving Booby Trapped Car.”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=972 (Text of report by Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV on 19 September)
[12, 13] Keefer, Michael. "Were British Special Forces Soldiers Planting Bombs in Basra? Suspicions Strengthened by Earlier Reports." http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=994
[14] Meyer, Sara. Basra Shadowlands. Index Research.
October 19 2005.
http://indexresearch.blogspot.com/2005/10/basra-shadowlands.html
[18, 19] BBC News. "UK soldiers 'freed from militia'" http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4262336.stm

TONKIN GULF OPINIONS

WHERE MOïSE AND I DISAGREE
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 10 2009

Since it’s all I have to offer anyway, I will momentarily skip out on further analysis and state my opinions on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Okay, I’ll cite a few supports, but the point is this might suffice as my final post on the subject, which is quick, since I’ve only put up three previously. I'm not even tempted to make any cool graphics for this one, after looking at the endless nonsensical scribbles Edwin E. Moïse had to wade through to re-construct the reality behind the two-hour circus of blunders.

From a cursory skim of some of the evidence, I find the faint possibility that some real vessels firing real torpedoes were involved, at least in the first part of the reported two-hour attack. This is the only aspect that might mean anything new; it would to me strongly imply a false flag operation involving RVN torpedo boats on a heavily-modified OPLAN 34-A raid. However, such a possibility raises many questions, and my guess is that it would not hold enough water to bother looking into it.

Aside from this intriguing distant possibility, I see little need to examine the actual non-events of August 4, 1964. All reputable and most non-reputable sources by now agree, from the overwhelming body of evidence, that no attack took place where one was claimed and aggressively pushed as the pretext for an endlessly escalating yet endlessly losing war of choice. Among all the surviving then-experts at NSA, CIA, Pentagon, various fleet commands, etc., one can find no surviving belief in the reality of this history-making engagement. Moïse’s Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War cites “profoundly disturbing” attempts by the U.S. Navy, as late as 1986, to pass the alleged attack off as real with an impressive-looking official history. [p xii] By now however even the Navy has given up the cause; as researcher John Prados explained in 2004, “the history of U.S. destroyers carried on the Navy's official website no longer contains any reference to a naval engagement having occurred on August 4.” [Prados]

Remaining questions encompass the area of unprovables – what did the active parties think and believe as they set this faux pas into motion? Opinions will differ, as mine and Moïse’s do; he feels the second attack reports were “not a deliberate fabrication” by the United States, as the North Vietnamese charged at the time. “I was quite sure that President Johnson had been making an honest mistake when he bombed the DRV in “retaliation” for an action the DRV had not committed.” [p xv] That author admits being embarrassed explaining this view to his Vietnamese hosts, who surely rolled their eyes, mentally at least. I’m not convinced he really believes that interpretation, what with former White House advisors and top generals and the like to interview, it might serve one well to avoid making such bold accusations – even if they seem warranted.

Of course he was also speaking with much of the epically befuddled destroyer crews who honestly believed the string of BS they reported that night. He doesn’t seem to feel anyone consciously made up anything, and proceeds examining how such massively erred reports originated absent any dishonesty. I’ve already expressed the possibility that the destroyer crews consciously made up the attack, and this would explain the consistency of error that reigned during the two hours an impossible attack was being reported. This is not a case I’ve seen anyone else make, and of course it’s entirely possible that an amazing string of errors in the tense climate triggered the hysteria after all. As the Pentagon set about constructing the story they’d stick with, the pressure from Washington to deliver an attack may have effected the crew only subconsciously, making their continued misinformation just more honest mistakes. Human memory can be, or can be presumed to be, infinitely strange.

Whatever the mindset behind the reports, it’s the pressure from above that matters - the suction of retaliation already in progress, that pulled out a bit more evidence, to the extent it even mattered once the wind was blowing that way. The force of that shift is clearly illustrated by President Johnson’s haste to hit back before figuring out whether there was really an engagement or not on August 4. The first draft of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was done up and discussed with some in Congress within nine hours of the first reports, and retaliatory air strikes underway five hours after that. And those were considered far behind schedule.

The military moved along the path blazed by the President’s decisive headlong rush to war. From what I’ve read, they did this with private reservations about the pretext, but otherwise with gusto and enthusiasm and no outward doubt. The first order of business was too get hostilities opened, the second to establish their collective cover story for the pretext, which wound up being a half-ass amalgamation of carefully screened evidence. This is the essence of fabrication, in its original sense. Separate threads were somehow brought together and were consciously woven by a pre-designated pattern; a “fabric” was undeniably formed, and a major and brutal war was then sewn from that fabric.

But was it deliberate? Moïse found “no evidence,” nor any “reason to suppose” anyone in the Washington leadership had any doubts about the incident during the crucial three days between its occurrence and the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. He did find evidence that President Johnson had passed from doubts about the attack’s veracity to little doubt it was all bogus within “a few days” of the incident, with his famous “flying fish” comment. [p. 210-211] Defense Secretary Robert MacNamara was initially and for a long time publicly certain their pretext was sound, privately expressing some doubts years later, and only deciding out loud that it was probably not real in 1995. He was clearly aware from at least mid-September 1964 that the President didn’t believe his own case, according to recorded conversations between the two declassified in 2001.

My opinion is if these people were inclined to any caution, they must have at least suspected the attack was unreal, grossly exaggerated, unverified, or something other than what they presented it as. Downplaying genuine doubts and presenting something other than what happened is, in a sense anyway, “deliberate fabrication.” Again, there is no way to prove whether LBJ, MacNamara, any of their subordinates or advisers or the generals and planners and escalators or the destroyer crews themselves knew they were selling bullshit. They might have honestly thought it was something wholesome and real, not realizing the stink. In my opinion, it all comes down to how fucking stupid you believe these guys were.

Sources:
Moïse, Edwin E. “Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.” Chapel Hill (University of North Carolina Press). 1997. 255 pages
Prados, John. Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. National Security Archive, George Washington University. Posted August 4 2004. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm

THE PRESIDENT’S HASTE

BLAZING THE TRAIL TO WAR
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 9 2009

PRIME-TIME MATERIAL
In his 1997 book Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, Edwin E. Moïse made an excruciatingly thorough examination of all available information and found “no evidence,” nor any “reason to suppose” President Johnson or Defense Secretary MacNamara had any doubts about the reported incident during the crucial three days before passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. [p 210] Of course the evidence was always ambiguous, contradictory, and unlikely at best, and all the doubts they needed were available to such high officials from the get-go. Instead, as Moïse writes:

“McGeorge Bundy has said that President Johnson decided at an early hour on August 4 – from his description of the timing, this might even have been before the shooting started, when all Johnson had were reports that the destroyers might be attacked – to use the incident as an occasion to get Congress to pass what was to become known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. […] Johnson had made up his mind. He had done so without first asking whether it was absolutely certain that an attack had actually occurred. [...] MacNamara [in seeking verification of the attack] was “asking on behalf of a president who had already committed himself to having a resolution and a speech and had the air time.”" [p 209]

Retaliatory bombing is serious, and should only be done based on verifiable, logical evidence of something to retaliate for. Very few if any doubts should be allowed, not “many,” as Commander Herrick warned along with his report. If you wait for daylight to look for evidence, as Herrick recommended, but find none, that should strengthen, not weaken, the doubts. Some solid visual contacts at least should be required, some damage to the ships verified as not caused by the other ship. Something resembling what the DRV was even capable of might be a good benchmark, and another that the August 4 reports failed to meet.

If one wants to avoid an honest mistake, a little time should be allowed to figure out questions like the above. But the President had his plan and his timeline; having been handed the attack reports conveniently at the working day’s beginning, he committed to go to war with it, to have strikes underway and announced live on national TV before too much of the nation was asleep for the night.

To fit this schedule, LBJ put immense pressure on the Defense Department to gather any verification possible and prepare counter-strikes for launch as early as possible. The military scrambled, complting a surface scan for evidence of a battle (negative), bringing in a second aircraft carrier, flying in extra jets, fueling, arming, target selection, pre-reconaissance, rules of engagement, so on. MacNamara and Johnson grew impatient as the evening deepened over the eastern seaboards and stated threatening their westward audiences. [p 214-16]

”AS I SPEAK…”
Once the air attacks were apparently, arguably, underway enough, the President was on the air at 11:37pm – about fourteen hours after first learning of the alleged attack. He announced to the world:

“[R]enewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. […] That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution…”

In fact, the attacks were about to begin, and LBJ jumping the gun to make the late news slot put the retaliatory mission in jeopardy. In fact, Vietnamese records reveal that whatever defenses they did erect against the air strikes were based on interception of this speech, which aired live well before the planes were in striking range, and just before the first radar readings were reported. [p 222]

That haste had only limited effect on the mission’s success and losses, but the brinksmanship is telling. Politics dictating military strategy Is nothing new, but it didn’t just set the timing of retaliation – it also guided what the military would have to “decide” about what happened in the Gulf that night.

VIETNAM BURNING OR WASHINGTON?
Once the first 24 hours had passed, it may have seemed to some that their job, aside from executing retaliation, was to find support for the vital war effort and the President’s snap decisions. There was certainly no order to this effect, but reality is capable of writing its own script once decided on and set in motion. The belli was rolling, and the casus would have to justify it, and the alternative may have looked rather ugly and dangerous to career military men.

Evidence was gathered, mostly at the hands of skilled Pentagon lawyers who “redebriefed” all classes of witnesses extracting legally admissible clues [p 186-187] Defense Department, Joint Chiefs, Pacific Fleet, etc. had their initial doubts, but allowed them to be quickly corrected by partial sightings, supporting intercepts (some just doctored together), more testimony and recollections and opinions leaning towards a genuine engagement, and most importantly “the flow.”

Johnson’s haste, which set the tempo of all this, might be effected by his famous engagement at the time in pressing domestic issues. All summer had been consumed with passing the Civil Rights Bill and related issues of the Freedom Summer era. Some in the south took it as a bit like a war, and three enemy agents – civil rights activists James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwermer - had suspiciously disappeared in Mississippi in late June. News that their bodies had been found by the FBI task force there reached the President on the night of the 4th, as he was waiting to announce the air strikes. [p. 216]

The episode of their killing – as fictitiously portrayed in 1988 movie Mississippi Burning - offers an interesting metaphor for what happened in Washington a month later. It’s been a while since I’ve seen the film, but I recall in the dead of night, the assassins with their police powers catch the three men driving alone on a back road and get them pulled over, unjustly harass them on some bogus explanation, and then begin the brutal violence. It’s painfully obvious this is the kind of infringement that gets you in trouble if witnesses talk about it. At this point it becomes clear they have passed all possibility of turning back on the course they’ve set, and one participant drawls with sinister pleasure something to the effect “well, we’re in it now boys!” However it really happened, the killers shot all three men dead, hid the bodies, concoct alibis and flaunted the feds, essentially declaring a war they would eventually lose.
---
Source: Moïse, Edwin E. “Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.” Chapel Hill (University of North Carolina Press). 1997. 255 pages

DESOTO PATROLS EXPLAINED

STIMULATE/RECORD/JUSTIFY?
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 5 2009
last update 6/5 3am

ORIGINS: CHINA SWALLOWS ITS PRIDE
It’s impossible to understand the Gulf of Tonkin Incident without first knowing the chain of decisions that brought two American ships into the place and the mindset necessary for the non-events that triggered a war. This mission was a “Desoto patrol,” a recent invention dating back to early 1962. As NSA historian Robert Hanyok later explained, these missions had twin objectives: “to collect intelligence in support of the embarked commander and higher level authorities and to assert freedom of navigation in international waters.” [1]

In a Desoto patrol, an unescorted destroyer, detached from the seventh fleet, sails as far as possible into enemy waters, flaunting their concept of territory while collecting intelligence for eventual hostile use. The first such mission was carried out by USS DeHaven, captained by RADM. James W. Montgomery, who later wrote of his experience penetrating the defenses of the People’s Republic of China. [2] Whether by direct order or prerogative allowed by the mission, they ignored all warnings, including the “serious” and “last” kind, each time answering with the ship’s name only. As the tense situation dragged on for days, it became essentially a high-stakes game of chicken with the risk of triggering a major war. There were psych-outs and elevated blood pressure on both sides of the coast line, but luckily (??) no shots were fired before the DeHaven finally left. Montgomery explained the importance of such a dangerous mission:

“The special operation was a then highly-classified intelligence gathering and probing excursion by USS DeHAVEN into waters that had not been visited by Pacific Fleet men-of-war since the late 1940s.” [3]

Desoto is of course the name of a famous Spanish explorer and Conquistador, which seems apt since these patrols were meant for re-exploring closed-off foreign territories, in support of Imperialist ambitions against Communist Asia. Montgomery however cites the name origin as an acronym for his own mission: “DEHAVEN Special Operations off TsingtaO” (DESOTO), which would better read DESOOT if that had the same resonance. [4] Whatever its name, the endeavor had the effect of forcing China to swallow its pride and keep swallowing ‘til it choked, as well as learning some nifty tidbits.

PATROLLING VIETNAM: JUST IN CASE
As Washington fretted over the devolving situation in Vietnam in 1964, direct military leverage against North Vietnam (DRV) was being considered. As William Rust explained for an excellent 1984 article in US News and World Report, the idea was to curb the North’s example to and support for the rebellious parts of the Capitalist-ruled, U.S.-supported South Vietnam. The principles for possible war were laid out by National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy on May 25; an initial strategy of "selected and carefully graduated military force” if push were to come to shove. [5] This decision was passed from the White House to the Pentagon, who set to working out specific details.

Desoto patrols had been carried out regularly in the interim, including along the North Vietnamese coast, but at this time it was decided to expand them; on July 15, Rust reports, the commander of the Pacific Fleet proposed new missions to gauge DRV coastal defenses. [6] The article cites this as being Admiral Ulyses S. Grant Sharp, but according to some sources, he had been replaced with Adm. Thomas H. Moorer nearly a month prior. [7] So whichever Admiral or on whatever date, the ensuing activity was certainly overseen, and enthusiastically, by Adm. Moorer. Earlier, when he had commanded the Seventh Fleet, he issued a directive in early 1963 “broadening the conduct of the Desoto Patrols,” writes merchant marine researcher Steve Edwards. Moorer also “relaxed the restrictions on approach distances,” allowing ships as close as four nautical miles from enemy land, which is key to what happened the following August. [8]

Again, the objectives here were to “collect intelligence and to assert freedom of navigation in international waters.” [9] The first appears to have some possible merit in this case, which I’ll discuss below, but the second, asserting “rights” as with the first such mission is troubling. In fact they had no right, as Rust reported for US News:

“The instruction to approach no closer than 8 nautical miles to the coast, and 4 miles to the offshore islands, had a provocative edge: Although Hanoi had never publicly announced the width of its territorial waters, naval-intelligence officials suspected that Hanoi would claim the 12-mile limit observed by other Communist nations. In effect, the Maddox had the delicate task of stimulating coastal defenses without provoking an attack.” [10]

The danger in agitating defenses is clear; just recall that the best sort of defense is often though to be offense. NSA historian Robert J. Hanyok may have been saying the same thing (depending on what was redacted here), while tying it together with the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission:

“U.S. intercept sites in the area were alerted to the real reason for the Desoto missions, which was to stimulate and record North Vietnamese [***** redacted text *****] reactions in support of the U.S. SIGINT effort.” [11 emph. in original, but italics]

Presenting the two aspects more separately, CINCPAC Sharp later explained the first objective "was to update our overall intelligence picture in case we had to operate against North Vietnam.” [12] The first strikes following the non-events of August 4 were by aerial bombardment, as they had likely decided from the start. This only seems natural and hardly worthy of mention, except that coastal defense information seems only slightly related to the planned operations.

Determining what kind of radar and anti-aircraft installations they have along the shore might prove useful, if they ever had the go-ahead to start bombing. In the meantime however, the gathering of peripheral information for potential air strikes risked a deadly incident that would necessitate… ahhh, well now it makes sense. Their dual mission could, if found intolerable enough, trigger a third and hidden aspect of the Desoto mission – to start a war. Only from this highly cynical point of view does a continued patrol regimen seem like an indisputably good idea. Rust explains how it was accepted:

“The Joint Chiefs and civilian authorities promptly approved Desoto; on July 17, the destroyer Maddox received orders to locate and identify radar transmitters, collect navigational information and conduct electronic surveillance along the North Vietnamese shoreline.” [13]

The ship was equipped with special listening booths attached to the deck – small trailers filled with equipment and room for the Naval Security Group detachment “whose presence defined this cruise as a DeSoto Patrol,” writes National Security Archive-associated researcher John Prados. [14] She set off from Taiwan, the patrol course was set, and Maddox got to work in Tonkin Gulf on July 31.

OPLAN 34-A: DOUBLE-SHOT STIMULATION
Recalling the observations above about the delicate art of stimulating defenses without eliciting an attack, the Maddox’s passes of the gulf were always in the shadow of yet further provocations - confusing commando sneak attacks designed in part to stimulate communications to spy on. [15] If not by design, these ventures also wound up increasing the likelihood of a challenge to an American destroyer’s right to be there (up to and including attack with intent to sink).

The rubric for these extra missions was something usually called “OPLAN 34-A.” These were joint ventures with South Vietnamese and other forces to cause “pinprick” damages to the DRV. Activities ranged from espionage to covert land strikes and, relevant here, coastal attacks by swift patrol boat raids in the dead of night. The United States generally has denied any involvement in these "purely Vietnamese" operations, but of course it was the Pentagon that coined the 34-A name, and at the very least they favored and promoted the strikes, and kept close track of their effects.

Desoto patrols and 34-A actions were in fact seen as feeding each other in a cycle. NSA’s Hanyok describes one side: “in early July, General Westmoreland requested more intelligence on Hanoi's forces which were capable of defending against an expanded OPLAN-34A program. […in response…] Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC, issued a new directive for a Desoto patrol whose purpose was "determining DRV coastal patrol activity." [16] John Prados shows the other: “In fact the mission of the Maddox was specifically to record North Vietnamese radar and other electronic emissions which could be expected to spike after a 34-A raid.” [17] More raids = better intel = better raids = more intel = what???

The Maddox was ordered to stay close to the coast, and as close as four miles from any of the gulf islands. Including Hon Me, attacked by South Vietnamese commandos on July 30, followed by nearby strikes on August 1 and 2. Maddox captain John Herrick was at first not even informed how much more difficult his balancing act had been made, and was completely surprised in the afternoon of August 2 when three highly-stimulated DRV PT (patrol/torpedo) boats shot out from behind Hon Me and gave chase.

The boats were small with smaller guns of minimal range, but their torpedoes were potentially lethal even to a destroyer. In this case, the Americans flinched and ran, shooting back along the way. The PT boats were no match for the destroyer’s five-inch guns and the air cover swiftly arriving from the USS Ticonderoga. Between defensive actions and orders from on high to cancel the unapproved and stupid attack, it ended with no American deaths or injuries and no damage to the Maddox, compared to 2/3 of the attacking force being sent to the bottom. There was thus little actual danger of a follow-on attack, but that was probably not as clear the men of the Maddox.

DAY OF DECISION: AUGUST 3
Prados notes that the battle of August 2 took place in International Waters, but noted that “the North Vietnamese made the logical connection that the 34-A raids and the destroyer's appearance were related.” [18] And of course they were closely related – evil conjoined twins of each other in fact. Herrick was therefore finally told about the 34-A missions around his beat, and that more were planned. He asked to have the patrol cancelled as an “unacceptable risk.” Admiral Moorer ordered it continued a essential to “adequately demonstrate United States’ resolve to assert our legitimate rights in these international waters.” [19]

President Johnson was following the events, concurred with Moorer, and personally suggested the patrol be beefed-up with a second destroyer – USS Turner Joy - perhaps to make the babies feel safer. [20] At the same time, the president had decided against moving too hastily on one attack alone; Eric Alterman writes “despite some tough talk directed at subordinates, Johnson decided to hold off on a full-fledged retaliatory attack,” hoping to convey “an impression of firm resolution as a contrast to the perceived trigger-happiness of his expected opponent Barry Goldwater.” [21] However, he was determined to appear and be “firm as hell” if the Vietnamese continued to act this way, which of course they probably wouldn’t.

Since not backing down was the order of the day, more OPLAN 34-A raids were executed on the night of August 3 in advance of the next day’s Desoto patrol. Steve Edwards describes how around 1500 four patrol/torpedo boats left Da Nang “with South Vietnamese commandos and Norwegian mercenary boat crews.” Around midnight they carried out their missions to “bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the south bank of the Ron River.” [22]

“By 0730 all MACSOG 34-A operators were breakfasting at the compound in Da Nang,” Edwards writes, and from there the stage was set for the fateful day of August 4 as the two destroyers again moved in for a nerve-wracking day. [23] At the other end of it, they would be sending reports halfway around the world that would give the White House its second apparent “unprovoked’ attack, to which there could only be one answer, and it would keep being delivered for about a decade.

---
Sources:
[1, 11], Hanyok, Robert J. "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish:
The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964." Originally published in Cryptologic Quarterly, Winter 2000/Spring 2001 Edition. Declassified for general reading later, now available here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/skunks.htm
[2-4] Montgomery, James W. Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret). The First DESOTO Patrol. Publish date not given. http://ussdehaven.org/first_desoto_patrol.htm
[5, 6] [9-10, 12-13] Rust, William. "The "phantom battle" that led to war; can it happen again?" US News and World Report. July 23, 1984. Posted online December 3 2005. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051203/3phantombattle.htm
[7] "U.S. Pacific Fleet." Wikipdia. Sub-heading "Commanders." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Pacific_Fleet
[8, 22-23] Edwards, Steve. Stalking the Enemy’s Coast [From PROCEEDINGS, February, 1992] http://www.ptfnasty.com/ptfStalking.html
[14, 16-18] Prados, John. Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Poster August 4 2004. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
[15, 19-21] Alterman, Eric. When Presidents Lie: A History of Official Deception and Its Consequences. Viking. 2004. pp 185-86

USS MADDOX ATTACK REPORTS

HERRICK’S WORDS AND TWO TRANSLATIONS
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
June 2 2009
last edit 6/5 2am

THE STAGE IS SET: HERRICK TO ELLSBERG
When I was debating Pearl Harbor at the JREF forum a few months back, Screw Loose Change co-creator “Brainster” countered any design for loss on FDR’s part with the observation that “zero US deaths on the USS Maddox led to [the war in] Vietnam.” “Too true!” I responded eagerly, knowing just enough about this incident, continuing:

“And look at how well that war went! Can you imagine if FDR had tried to base WWfrigginII on some fake out boat incident deep inside Japan's sphere of influence? You think hippies on campus caused a problem, right wingers have guns and such... I know it sounds a stretch to say the event shapes the war, but on some level it does, the question is how much.” [1]

This passing thought came back to a point when I learned – last night - that Daniel Ellsberg, the Pentagon insider-turned dissident who was among the chief actors in the war’s undoing - was there as it started on the wrong foot. In his memoirs he reveals he was the man at the Pentagon who first received Captain Herrick’s reports about the attack, opening his book on the war of lies with this episode, and so I’ll open my Tonkin Gulf inquiry here as well.

”On Tuesday morning, August 4, 1964, my first full day on my new job in the Pentagon, a courier came into the outer office with an urgent cable for my boss. He'd been running. The secretaries told him Assistant Secretary John McNaughton was out of the office; he was down the hall with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. They pointed him to me, his new Special Assistant. The courier handed me the cable and left. It was easy to see, as I read it, why he had been running.

It was from Captain John J. Herrick, the commodore of a two-destroyer flotilla in the Tonkin Gulf, off North Vietnam in the South China Sea. He said he was under attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats and he had opened fire on them.
[…] Within ten minutes he was back to me with another cable from the same series: "Am under continuous torpedo attack." […] A few minutes later, Herrick reported another torpedo had run by him, and that two more were in the water. […] The messages were vivid. [...] "Have. . . successfully avoided at least six torpedoes."

Nine torpedoes had been fired at his ships, fourteen, twenty-six: the sea was awash with torpedoes. More attacking boats had been hit, at least one sunk. This action wasn't ending after forty minutes or an hour. It was going on, ships dodging and firing in choppy seas, planes overhead firing rockets at locations given them by the Turner Joy's radar, for an incredible two hours before the stream of continuous combat updates finally ended.” [2]

I’m having a hard time locating any clear versions of these early communications besides snippets like these re-printed from obscure works, but their gist is clear – a major prolonged attack supported by many fast-moving reports.

MANY DOUBTS/MY TRANSLATION
About an hour after the last battle message, however, there came a “full stop,” Ellsberg recalls. “A message arrived that took back not quite all of it, but enough of it to put everything earlier in question.” [3] This follow-up message introducing doubts is more widely quoted and read thus:

“Review of action makes many recorded contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects and over-eager sonarman may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action.” [4]

Well this is certainly a bizarre thing to say after an hours-long battle one had barely survived. This incongruous uncertainty triggered what witer Eric Alterman called “a flurry of pointed inquiries from the highest levels of the Pentagon” [5] which in turn prompted another rosier report with more evidence of attack after all:

"Further recap reveals Turner Joy fired upon by small-caliber guns and illuminated by searchlight. Joy tracked two sets of contacts. Fired on 13 contacts. Claim positive hits 1, 1 sunk, probabe hits 3. Joy also reports no actual visual sightings or wake. Have no recap of aircraft sightings but seemed to be few. Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent attempted ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft.” [6]

Captain Herrick seems to be operating here in a world different from the three-dimensional one we all inhabit, and his words are less reflection of coherent truth than impressionist brush strokes suggesting a possible reality that could be taken or left. From my intuition and the moderate amount I know about this incident, he seems to be saying “we were viciously attacked, maybe, probably not, but maybe, definitely we think – look, we don’t know, if you think we did then we did. Check it out yourselves, if you want, but that’s our report. We got attacked. Can we go home now?”

Rendering an accurate translation takes a knowledge of context, foremost the “Desoto patrol” that had both Maddox and its danger-zone company Turner Joy sent again into this Gulf to spy and to defy attacks. This was carried out alongside “OPLAN 34A” provocations feeding off-Desoto intel and stirring up more. Some stimulated reactions, the President had already decided, could only be met with military firmness. Maddox had been attacked two days before, on August 2. LBJ seemed to feel he needed two such events in order to get firm while seeming well-justified, and the provoke-then-patrol system was continued.

The Maddox was given a partner, Turner Joy for the mission of the 4th and promised air cover. Herrick had been alerted of new 34A provocations, and received Pentagon warnings of another imminent attack, and yet his protests to just cancel it as an “unacceptable risk” were denied. Thus the captains of both ships were given every reason to both worry about torpedo strikes and sinking, and to think about why they were being exposed to such danger. It seems possible that this inspired them to simply imagine the inevitable attack hoping - perhaps unconsciously - that a false report would give the leadership what it wanted without the pain and death of a real attack. This is just an uniformed impression from a cynical blogger, but there it is.

THE BASTARD PIMP LBJ’S TRANSLATION
President Johnson and his top aides all claimed to believe the attack reports, at least at first, when it mattered. But LBJ’s words on September 18 show he was aware there was no attack, that his own case upon which the war was escalating by his choice, was fraudulent. White House recordings, released in 2001, transcribed by Eric Alterman for his book When Presidents Lie. In a discussion with Secretary of Defense MacNamara, Johnson reminds him that “you just came in … a few weeks ago and said that “Damn, they are launching an attack on us – they are firing on us.” When we got through with all the firing we concluded maybe they hadn’t fired at all.” [7] This is both an accurate summary of what happened in the Gulf, and a metaphor for the larger movement of the national “we” and its reaction of retaliatory bombing and resolution-passing.

“I have found over the years that we see and we hear and we imagine a lot of things in the form of stacks and shots and people running at us,” he sad, apparently explaining why the erred reports both make sense and annoy him. It would “make us very vulnerable,” he told MacNamara, if it that were the case here, and the reported attack they were then starting a war over “just wasn’t true at all.” He shows signs of believing just this, while proceeding full-tilt in that vulnerability. “It looks like to me they would hear a shot or see a shot or do something before they get worked up […] I want to be tough where we … are justified being tough … But I sure want more caution on the part of these admirals and these destroyer commanders … about whether they are being fired on or not.” [8]

He seemed less concerned with the truthfulness of the reports than with their ambiguity. “I don't know why in the hell, some time or other, they can't be sure that they are being attacked.” There are only two alternatives to flase attack reports, and it’s not clear which he’s looking for – no attacks, as had been happening so far with Hanoi trying to avoid a confrontation, or true reports of real attacks. [9]

Finally, this bastard summoned the chutzpah to re-state himself thus: “I don’t want them just being some change o’life woman running up and saying that, by God, she was being raped just because a man walks into the room!” [10] This from the man who approved and endorsed the system that had their “women” regularly sent into rooms already crowded with leering, pornography-addled men (buzzed-to-drunk on liquor air-dropped just before their women arrived) – to “assert their right as women to go where they please” and study the psycho-sexual behavior of the "men" in the "room."

By God, the President doesn’t want to hear some prudish false charges. Under the circumstances, should a real rape be so hard to come by? Or at least a more convincing made-up one? Those Texas knuckles are aching to make contact with a genuine rapist’s face! If the guys in the Gulf made the call I outlined above, it worked in the end, and the beatings did commence, even if the chief was frustrated with his silly little "women."

Sources:
[1] http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?t=136679&page=2
[2], [3] Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers Chapter one. http://www.kean.edu/~ggluck/EllsbergChapterOne.htm
[4, 5, 6] Alterman, Eric. When Presidents Lie. Viking. 2004.Page 188.
[7, 8, 9, 10] Alterman. pp 201-202.

USS LIBERTY FLAG THOUGHTS

O SAY, CAN YOU SEE? NO, REALLY, CAN YOU?
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
[USS Liberty series]
May 31 2009

So far in my investigation of the Liberty incident, I’ve reached a similar conclusion to that of many survivors – the ship’s identity was likely well known to its Israeli attackers, both at the tip of the spear and at the shoulder of command. However, one of the lynchpin arguments of the survivors - that the American flag flying from their main mast had to be visible and known throughout the day – comes in far down the list of egregious and persistent “mistakes” by the Israeli Defense Forces. These moves all share the common denominator of justifying the attack, with varying degrees of plausibility from the humdrum to the absurd, and beyond. I find failing to note Old Glory relatively believable, and, as if my opinion matters, I’ll explain why.

In my first arguments, I started to question how the pilots could miss the huge friggin’ American flag, but then decided I’d better check if I could see the thing. It took a little while to find a clear enough shot to even make out the little scrap nestled up there, less visible than the nearby signal flags. Along this line, accident advocate Dr. Marvin Nowicki makes a valid point:

”In reconstruction of the attack, the Liberty crew makes much of flying the American flag, as if it would somehow protect them in harm's way. Little does the crew appreciate the difficulty of identifying a ship from an aircraft merely on the basis of a flag or even a hull number (GTR 5 displayed by the Liberty). […referring to photograph below…] This crisp overhead photo does not clearly show the identity of the American ship. So how could the attacking Israeli forces conclude this was a friendly ship?” [1]

This is the photo in question, here with the flag area actually highlighted with realistic colors. It’s still hardly more than a speck. Now I do see a clear difference between the flag and the hull number, well-illustrated by the same photo, which does in fact identify the ship with or without the flag being noticeable. No one has had any doubts if the hull was fully extended or drooping and unreadable; the “5” in particular is ten feet high, all letters of the solid block type, with offset drop-shadows to enhance clarity. This designation belongs to only one ship in the world.

Among the Liberty’s own mistakes that clearly brought it on themselves, per IDF, are “failure to signal,” changing direction, “running away,” hiding under smoke, trying to guilt trip them with the dead guys bleeding on deck, etc. (okay, I made up the last one) “Another grave error” discussed in Col. Ron’s report is that “it seems that the ship made every effort to conceal her identity” by, for example, “flying a small flag which was unidentifiable from a distance.” [2] He doesn't clarify whether the flag was smaller than it should have been or just small enough to offer as an excuse.

IDF records have admitted absolutely no reports of a flag from their the eight-plus aircraft orbits conducted over the day. Official records show the attacking planes never noticed such a flag, nor the Motor Torpedo Boats that nearly sank the Liberty. As Judge Yerushalmi’s report put it (once translated) “throughout the contact no American or any other flag appeared on the ship, and it was only a helicopter, sent after the attack in order to render assistance--if necessary--which noticed a small American Flag flying over the target.” [3] This total absence I find both unlikely and at least faintly possible.

The Hull number on the other hand was something they couldn’t even pretend to miss, and was reported multiple times. The first such acknowledgment came after the 0600 Noratlas overflight; the accurate reading “GTR-5” generated a precise ID as the USS Liberty, which was almost instantly erased for still-debatable reasons. It was eight hours later when the hull no. was reported again as “CTR-5” - not enough to name the Liberty but enough it had the air attack called off after a fierce fifteen minutes. This failed to prevent the MTB surface attack, which was finally cancelled after all but one of its torpedoes were spent. It wasn’t a flag they explained this with, but the same hull no. seen again, not far from the bungalow-sized hole they just blew out of the hull. [details on this]

That’s a powerful identifier, and could have averted catastrophe, rather than just tripping it up a bit. If GTR hadn’t been erased, CTR would mean something, so this decision trumps the more wiggly flag issue in my mind.

At times it seems keeping this particular issue front and center is more motivated by symbolism and appeal patriotism than by pure evidentiary considerations. What it really does is dramatize the patriotic war/sacrifice/vengeance/etc. aspect and taps into the old us vs. them mentality. Consider the painting on the cover of James Ennes’ book – Star of David vs. Old Glory, emphasis on “vs.” Interestingly, it seems this painting is based on the same photo of the ship as above, but with the barely visible real flag eclipsed by the mammoth symbolism. Hardly any dedicated patriot can’t help but be effected by this dichotomy – whether it’s toward questioning the accident or away from it is bound to vary.

FIFTEEN THOUGHTS: PRO AND CON
Now, clearly the U.S. flag is a crucial clue that should have been seen at some point. And given the general pattern of errors and missed signals in IDF command that day, I have a hard time accepting that – again - all parties had genuinely missed the flag from sunrise until just after the attack. Taken on its own, however, I admit it seems possible, and not even bizarre. So I can see both sides on this one and don’t normally go on about the flag when there are stronger cases to make. However, here are some final flag thoughts from both sides – “pro” means a point supports that the flag should have been seen and reported, and “con” indicates a reason maybe it wouldn’t be so clear.

Con: At one point at least, the flag then flying was found to be tarnished "tangled in the lines [...] dark with soot and badly tattered," according to James Ennes, who caught it and ordered a new flag up shortly after 0700. [4] This may well have been a factor in the 0600 sighting, which ironically was the only pre-attack inspection of the Liberty that yielded an accurate ID.

Con: Both the tarnished flag and its replacement were quite small relative to the ship – app. five by eight feet (see picture above, and K.J. Halliwell’s examination of flag size).

Pro: The ship’s weather log plus speed and heading shows the flag should have been at least largely unfurled as the air attack began; Ennes concluded 12 knots relative wind at 1300 (5 knots from ship speed. plus 7 of wind on a similar line back) [5].

Pro: Wind would probably be similar at 1400 as IDF sources cite “a run over the ship” by the fighters prior to attack, looking for a spread flag (“but found none”). [6] The witness record seems to show immediate attack. IDF transcripts show nothing but a one-minute distance survey (“warship” was the only conclusion) prior to strafing. [7] That someone apparently made up the looking for a flag, or removed the episode from the tapes, supports that the flag was visible.

Pro: unfurled or drooping is not as relevant as its made – if they could see it well enough to identify spread, they could have identified it limp as well, if they cared to. US would appear prominently as red and white jumbled, or “splashed” together, perhaps looking pink from a distance, with a blue corner visible even drooping. Either a Soviet or an Egyptian (U.A.R.) flag would stand out like – well, a red flag. Solid red is vivid, and it wasn’t there to see.

Pro: A photo as above is not a good model – they’d see the any flag moving over time, rippling even if subtly. You might glimpse a red-white-pink flicker, zero in and see a wobbling dark blue patch cover it, with no bold red visible. What flag can that be?

Con: As Nowicki wrote: “Based on my experience of flying many "low and slow" reconnaissance flights over ships in the Med and Atlantic with VQ2, unless the flights are almost overhead, target identification is virtually impossible." [8]

Pro: The attacking aircraft supposedly felt it was possible enough to try, they were directly over the ship, at close and low quarters, passing over it from different angles for at least five minutes each wave. In the early part of the attack at least the flag and hull no. should have been discernable to one of the pilots on one of the passes, at the very least.

Pro: Several witnesses (including Nowicki) claim they heard transmissions or saw transcripts of same showing the IDF pilots did spot the U.S. flag and reported it, either before the first strafing run, which was ordered regardless, or during the attack, causing it to be broken off. If so, this means the IDF altered their records, further illustrating guilty conscience.

Pro: If they were unable to verify a flag when it was up, the pilots became strangely able to know when it was down; the decisive “there’s no flag on her!” was reported at the end of the air attack, 1414, alongside the hull no. report. [9] By this time the statement was actually true; the halyard line it swung from had been severed in the attack, and the flag lay face down on the burning deck. This indicates to me he knew where it had been and wasn’t anymore.

Pro: The motor torpedo boat crews were perhaps close enough to actually observe the larger (8x13?) replacement flag being hoisted for their arrival, and it almost certainly should be visible by binoculars once they got closer. The ship was sailing at something over ten knots due north before they hit it, so some cross-wind should have been lifting the holiday colors.

Pro: The MTB crew don’t acknowledge (in their log, or that of Navy HQ) seeing the flag until the helicopters told them about it at 1512, after they’d spent the better part of an hour hanging out within a mile or less of the ship. This reeks more of omission than of anything else.

Con: The ship was of course by then emitting a mass of smoke from the air attack. The fires were partly under control, but still factors of some visibility impairment.

Con: In the photo above the flag seems perhaps 6-800 feet from the camera – the MTBs were app. ten times as far off (accounts vary), perhaps too far to identify, when they decided to drop their torpedoes at 14:35.

Pro: The IDF records flaglessness finally runs out with the second rescue helicopter pilot who finally saw the stars and stripes and reported it as such, verified in a second pass. It was 15:12. As a journalist reported of a 2003 talk with James Bamford, “if the helicopter pilot saw those identifiers, Bamford asks, why didn't the fighter pilots and torpedo boat crews?” [10] There may be legitimate technical explanations, but we can’t ignore the common theme among those who failed to see – they were the ones shooting the ship, perhaps sent to simply attack, not look at stuff.

Sources:
[1]Nowicki, Marvin. Exculpatory evidence supporting a mistaken attack. Undated message to James Bamford. http://www.libertyincident.com/nowicki-evidence.html
[2]
[3]
[4] Ennes, James. Assault on the Liberty. 1979. P
[5] See [4]. pp 245-247 (Appendix H)
[6]
[10] Shane, Scott. NSA tapes offer clues in '67 attack on U.S. spy ship. Baltimore Sun. July 16 2003. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/947319/posts

TELEX AND TAPES, PART TWO

THE MEN BEHIND THE TRANSCRIPTS WEIGH IN
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
[USS Liberty series]
May 28 2009

NOWICKI AND BAMFORD: INFORMATION MISUSED?
Part one of this series listed the witnesses to secret attack-the-flag transcripts of the USS Liberty attack - translated copies of American (NSA) intercepts of the IDF communications proving the Israeli intent to attack a known American ship, for whatever reason. Therefore, perhaps the most informed witnesses would be the guys who made these recordings, apparently stationed on a US Navy controlled EC-121 aircraft circling 15,000 feet over the general war zone.

The plane was on a NSA SIGINT mission, and staffed to effectively spy on both sides. This plane contained the normal retinue of Russian and Arabic linguists, as well as three trained Hebrew Linguists (called “special Arabic” at the time). [1] Relative newcomers to the world of public scrutiny, two of the three NSA Jew-spying-spooks listening in from above have been named.

Dr. Marvin Nowicki is the more famous one of the two, starting with an e-mail to NSA’s nom d’plume James Bamford in March 2000, as he was assembling his magnum opus Body of Secrets. The insider enclosed five documents, including Assault on the Liberty: The untold Story from SIGINT, which explained their presence above the Liberty and what they heard there. This became the kernel of Bamford’s chapter on the attack, which came out highly critical of the IDF and supportive of the crew’s views. That Nowicki’s account was seamlessly worked into supporting this meant distortion was afoot, and he complained publicly in a letter to the Wall Street Journal:

“My position, which is opposite of Mr. Bamford's, is that the attack, though terrible and tragic especially to the crew members and their families on that ill-fated day in June 1967, was a gross error.” [2]

Accident advocate Judge Cristol took up Nowicki’s case, re-publishing this letter and all the materials sent to Bamford, who “claims the Nowicki letter told him that the tapes establish that the Israelis knew they were attacking a US ship,” Cristol explains. “Dr. Nowicki did not agree with Bamford's interpretation.” [3] The judge points to the e-mail and its five enclosures, which collectively offer a cogent and well-researched Cristol-light attempted absolution. He felt the attack on an ally was a mistake, and ironically that was from hearing and re-examining the same transmissions several others had said proved, once in print, that it was a purposeful decision. And his familiarity with the material didn’t end when he handed it over to the NSA’s analysts.

“[T]he next time I saw those voice tapes […]completely re-transcribed […] was over a year later when I was ordered to NSA for duty in 1968. […] Up to this point, I always felt the evidence we collected showed the Israelis attacked the Liberty by mistake in the heat of battle. All my conversations with colleagues in G643 and reading of the voice transcript confirmed as much to me.” [4]

The NSA had the audio, but decided against admitting it, or even acknowledging the plane was there. James Ennes’ 1979 book was written in complete ignorance of the flight, and it remained secret for another two decades past that. Nowicki’s second attachment explained his efforts to have it all publicized to quell the rumors.

"Several months before I retired in 1979, I even wrote a personal letter to the Commander of the Naval Security Group, Rear Admiral Eugene Ince, saying I thought it was time to make the information public. Admiral Ince surely knew about the VQ-2 tapes because he was the senior NSG officer on the staff of CINCUSNAVEUR in 1967 during the attack on the Liberty. I received no reply from him.” [5]

Nowicki points only to one phase of attack halting as evidence of mistake theory, which fails to explain why it was brutally resumed minutes later. Apparently the tapes would make it all clear once publicized. By 2000 this had still not happened, and we had only the chief’s account to Bamford, the case it was woven into for Body of Secrets, and the rebuttals.

IN HIS OWN WORDS: NOWICKI VS. IDF
It’s true that Nowicki told Bamford up-front that “our intercepts, never before made public, showed the attack to be an accident on the part of the Israelis.” [6] The author could have mentioned this sentiment in the book but failed to. Otherwise I see no misrepresentation. He simply used the words to support a general picture already painted by plenty of other people and evidence. His account is high-quality, detailed and well-assembled, and of clear historical significance. Some key quotes mined from the various sources [emph mine throughout], with comparative notes added:

"After a couple of hours of hard work, I received a heated call on the secure intercom from Hebrew linguist [deleted]. [deleted] excitedly proclaimed something to the effect, "Hey, Chief, I've got really odd activity on UHF. They mentioned an American flag. I don't know what's going on." I asked him for the frequency and rolled up to it. Sure, as the devil, Israeli aircraft were completing an attack on some object. I alerted the Eval, giving him sparse details, adding that we had no idea what was taking place. The activity subsided." [7]

By this, the chief missed some of the audio, including the flag report, before getting the phones on to hear the end of an air attack. Such a report is not in the IDF’s tapes at all, with no flag mentioned (except once in the negative – “there is no flag on her!”). Air Force recordings, as now available, make no mention of a US flag at all until the rescue helicopters arrive, shortly after 15:00 – a half hour after the attack was finally called off, and nearly an hour after the attacking jets left the area.

"After some time passed, Petty Officer [deleted] called me again. He told me about new activity and that the American flag is being mentioned again. I had the frequency but for some strange reason, despite seeing it on my spectrum analyzer, couldn't hear it on my receiver, so I left my position to join him to listen at his position. I heard a couple of references to the flag during an apparent attack. The attackers weren't aircraft; they had to be surface units (we later found out at USA-512J it was the Israeli motor torpedo boats attacking the Liberty). […] Despite replaying portions of the tapes, we still did not have a complete understanding of what transpired except for the likelihood that a ship flying the American flag was being attacked by Israeli air and surface forces." [8]

There’s a time delay after the chatter subsides, maybe correlating to the air-MTB intermission of about ten minutes. Then the flag was mentioned again, multiple times during the renewed attack by torpedo boats. This is a new twist the other witnesses didn’t catch. He feels it’s this flag report that finally has the attack called off. If they said U.S. flag multiple times and the EC-121 heard it, that’s interesting since any such report during this time failed to make it into either the MTB or Navy logs.

“My personal recollection remains after 34 years that the aircraft and MTBs prosecuted the Liberty until their operators had an opportunity to get close-in and see the flag, hence the references to the flag.” [9]
"Although the attackers never gave a name or a hull number, the ship was identified as flying an American flag." [10]

This is just about dead backwards from the IDF’s tapes of their communications. As I’ve found, their records show it was not a flag, but rather the hull number GTR-5, and perhaps the name Liberty, that had the attack called off twice. The second time it was said these indicated a Soviet ship.

“We have no idea what time any […] information about the American flag was made available in the war room. I think it was probably during the MTB attack because the torpedo boats halted their attacks when they could have finished off the Liberty.” [11]

We know now what time they claim anyway – 1512 local time. Torpedo hit was at 1435.

“[O]ur intercepts […] showed the attack to be an accident on the part of the Israelis.” [12]
“Our intercepts further showed that perhaps the attack was a mistake.” [13]

Just how? The fact that the "flag" stopped it? That's not the reason the IDF settled on. This dangerously aberrant version has direct knowledge of American ID running openly throughout the attack, rather than concealed in double-talk as it seems from the available sources. Any report of a flag failed to make it into the IDF air control tapes and failed to prevent the ridiculous re-identification as El Quseir leading to the deadly torpedo assault [see above link]. The recollection he shares does seem vague enough that it’s open to interpretation – in the same data one person might see intent, the other confusion. Both see the stars and stripes specifically failing to stop the attack, in direct contradiction of the IDF's documentation.

CORROBORATION: PROSTINAK COMES FORWARD
The “teammate” cited by Chief Nowicki, the one excited about "something crazy on UHF," is apparently Petty Officer Michael Prostinak. He did not talk to and remained unnamed by Bamford, but did come out in his chief’s wake and spoke to John Crewdson for his 2007 Chicago Tribune article. Since those days intercepting war chatter, Prostinak had settled down in a small North Carolina town to be chief of police and later a town administrator. He told the paper "everyone we were listening to was excited. You know, it was an actual attack. […] We copied it until we got completely out of range. We got a great deal of it." Although this accounts is much thinner, at least once edited into the article, it verifies Nowicki’s recollection of flag reports at this time: “During the attack was when mention of the American flag was made." Crewdson explains how “[Prostinak’s] Hebrew was not good enough to understand every word being said, but that after the mention of the American flag "the attack did continue.”” [14]

Again, Crewdson was able to “twist” this into fitting with the shoot-the-flag transcript reports. It wasn’t difficult, since it has more attacking after the identification, just like Nowicki’s account. Both the linguists’ stories differ from what other witnesses in some key ways - the flag is not apparently not reported before either phase of assault, and they mention no pilots protesting or resisting their orders. So far however, all knowledgeable American sources agree that the flag was reported by the attacking forces and this somehow failed to halt the attack. Prostinak does not say that it was an intentional mistake – for all we know, he feels it’s just a mix-up in communications. Nowicki specifically says it was accidental, but many others from a wider field reached the opposite conclusion on seeing it in print. Nowicki summed up the answer to the dilemma as well as the other side might:

”How can I prove [my version]? I can't unless the transcripts/tapes are found and released to the public. I last saw them in a desk drawer at NSA in the late 1970s before I left the service.” [15]

Apparently spurred by the Bamford/Nowicki revalations, Judge Cristol filed a FOIA lawsuit against NSA in April 2001 to get the tapes. Not far from his home turf, Cristol wrangled with the Florida district court system and NSA’s lawyers for release of any transmissions to or from USS Liberty, USS Amberjack (submarine, long story), or the EC-121 everyone was talking about [16]. The lawsuit would eventually yield results, but this would take years to unfold, and one more post, part three, before I can use that to close up this story line with a final twist in part four.

Sources:
[1] Bamford, Body of Secrets p. 205
[2], [15] Nowicki, Mavin. Letter to The Wall Street Journal. Published May 16, 2001, page A-23. http://www.libertyincident.com/nowicki-wsj.html
[3] Cristol. Nowicki Documents. http://www.libertyincident.com/nowicki.html
[4], [5] Nowicki, Marvin. Postscript to the attack on the Liberty. 2000? http://www.libertyincident.com/nowicki-ps.html
[6] Nowicki, Marvin to James Bamford. E-mail, March 3, 2000. http://www.libertyincident.com/nowicki-email.html
[7]
[14] Crewdson, John. "New revelations in attack on American spy ship." Chicago Tribune. October 2 2007. (Additional material published Dec 2). Page 6. http://www.chicagotribune.com/services/newspaper/printedition/tuesday/chi-liberty_tuesoct02,0,1050179.story?page=6
[16]A. Jay Cristol, Pro Se, Plaintiff, v. National Security Agency, Defendant. U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. Case No. 03-20123. Various documents. http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/cristol.html

AIRCRAFT PHOTO ANALYSIS

1245 RECONNAISSANCE OF LIBERTY?
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
May 25 2009
incomplete

THE PROOF IN THE PUDDING
At least one photograph of presumed reconnaissance aircraft (above) has survived and is published on the USS Liberty survivors association image index web page with the following caption:

Israel says there was no pre-attack reconnaissance. Any aircraft we saw, they say, were high in the sky carrying troops to the battlefield. Not so. Here is an Israeli reconnaissance airplane that circled the ship about an hour before the attack. The pilot was heard reporting to HQ that he saw an American flag and men sunning themselves on deck. [1]

First, it does seem to be checking the ship out. It’s quite close, low, passing starboard side to the aft and clearly turning as if to keep circling. This is not a casual disinterested high-alt pass-over. However, that flag-n-sunbathers report is news to me, and so far I see no source aside from this image index. And also I’m pretty sure the time frame “about an hour” before the 1400 attack is wrong.

This photo would perhaps have been taken by Petty Officer Charles Rowley, the ship’s photographer, reportedly in the lab most of the morning during the earlier aircraft recon. [2] It could have been someone else as well. The picture was apparently taken from the aft (rear) portion of the ship, looking back and to their right of the rear antenna mast (visible at left). Its crossbars extend left and right, across the beam, and the small lights (lower corner) are fairly low to the deck, so the camera is apparently at main deck level and pointed up at a moderate angle. At right is a wire mesh thing I can’t locate in photos, and apparently anchoring cables for some antenna. My right-side reference is thus un-anchored. Should be TRSSCOM housing there (Here's a good view of the rear of the ship, seen from the middle - TRSSCOM is the big dish, rear antenna mast behind that).

Anyway, the aircraft is quite close off the port aft, not very high above the waves, banking and turning left. Both the fuselage shadow on left wing and the light falling on the mast and its lights shows the sun is quite high in the sky, meaning, in general, around mid-day. I checked with a solar calculator the lat-long points, date, year, time, and found solar noon on the Liberty's path would fall one second after 11:44 local time. (selecting Cairo, June 8 1967, UTC offset -2, will get you close).

WHAT THE PLANE TELLS US

In my previous analysis of aerial reconnaissance reports, I got a general grasp of what different craft are said to have circled the ship. Anywhere near mid-day we first have two delta-wing Mirage fighters orbiting the ship thrice at about 1000 or 1030 (accounts vary). This is clearly not one of those, and both slots seem too early for the sun here. This was followed by two or three visits, at perhaps 1030, and certainly at 1057 and 1126, by a craft thought by the crew similar to a “Flying Boxcar”, and called by its Israeli owners a Noratlas. The two do indeed resemble each other, but not the plane in this photo. So barring a problem with the accepted timeline, this must be after 11:26, and presumably after the subsequent course change at 11:32, where they turned thirty degrees to the north.

The aerial visits after that point are more sketchy for detail, but this photo is said to be “about an hour” before attack, so it could only be the last visit, what Ennes cites as another visit of the “Flying boxcar” at 1245 (second-hand – he was having lunch) [3] But as we’ve established that’s no Noratlas, and it seems the sun is no match for that late in the day either. Jundge Cristol describes a1200 flight, way up at 30,000 feet, and the wrong aircraft to boot; he cites as a “Vatour,” but it would actually be a Vautour, which is French for vulture. [4]

The plane we see here is not a fit with any of the over-flying craft I’m aware of. It’s non-descript, generic, bulky body, low-set wings with engines beneath like any smaller cargo plane or airliner. Something tells me those are propellers, not jet engines. I’m really no plane buff. It is a possible fit with one other reported aircraft never reported close by - [56, 50] a “fat little prop plane, maybe a light bomber” repeatedly traversing the beach, “just skimming the sand dunes.” This was first reported before 0700, with no specific mentions after. But as Ennes noted explosions ashore between 1130 and 1200, he did note “the little bomber that had patrolled the beach all morning could no longer be seen.” [5]

With no other planes besides Noratlas and Mirage jets mentioned before the 1132 turn, this is probably after that but apparently not much after. The next plane alleged is 11:45, a fit for the time of the explosions. This is one of the less verified, only mentioned in a list in the Salans Memo with no details (see previous post, link above). Who saw what plane do what at that time? Ennes was officer of the Deck, and would have seen such a plane, but there is no mention in his book, just the Noratlas again in his absence at 1215 and 1245. [6] Wrong plane and time for this case. Again with the time, how do I know what time it is here?

WHAT THE EGYPTIAN SUN TELLS US
11:45 is one minute past local solar noon, with the sun at its highest elevation (82° above the horizon, so nearly overhead). and with an azimuth (direction to sun) of 180° - due south. First I presumed this was after the 11:32 course change, so I set my model on a 283 heading and set to narrowing down the solar azimuth angle which helps me get a close time estimate. I found the light angle, approximate, from the rear mast (lower left corner) by analyzing light fall-off around the mast’s curve and and shadow patterns on its attached lights. They indicated one general direction, which I marked with arrows – some to and some from the sun, whatever.

This I pasted back on the ship at the proper angle (not to scale, that doesn’t matter). To hit the mast at that angle with the ship at 283 true, the azimuth would be somewhere around 168, or in a range of, say, 162-174. This is consistent with a general noon-ish time frame indicated by the high solar elevation. And the Azimuth is much better at setting time - the change I'm seeing here is close to one degree per minute!

The exact minute is not to be taken too literally given the margins of error in each step – but the resultant azimuth range for a 162-174 spread is between 1132-1141 local time. I simply can’t see anything outside this range explaining that photo. Either this is Ennes’ 1126 misidentified “flying boxcar” (and the Captain’s 1126 “unidentified”), lingering quite a bit, or it’s the unknown rounded-to-1145 plane that Ennes missed as he wrapped up his shift.

MY USS LIBERTY INQUIRY

A WELCOME, AND A CALL FOR INVOLVEMENT
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
May 22 2009

Welcome to my Caustic Logic USS Liberty inquiry!

For a while now I’ve been intrigued by the anomalous Israeli attack on the USS Liberty way back in 1967. I started out seeing the attack as presented in the video Dead in the Water. I don’t mean the cover-up of some war maneuver or massacre, which seems to me silly, for reasons I’ll explain more fully elsewhere. Rather I find merit in the attempted false flag interpretation, where the attack was to be blamed on the Egyptians and draw America into the war, or into something useful anyway. Obviously if that was the goal, it would require silencing the crew momentarily with total communications jamming, and then permanently by sending the ship to the bottom. If these were their goals, they failed decisively in both, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they didn’t try. Sometimes you start with one plan and then have to change in the middle…

Intriguing as this narrative can be, I never did quite believe it. Looking closer at the evidence, that possibility still lingers, but is less solid than I first thought, and I’m starting to feel it was perhaps more of a false “no flag” attack. The sticking point for me is identity – on at least some levels, if not all, the IDF knew they were attacking an American ship or, at the very least, that it was not the Arab ship(s) they were pretending it was. The blunders leading to the “mistaken” attack show the outlines of what might have been called “Operation Oops!” The goal may have been only to maim the ship and make a point of nearly sinking her in tragic error that might be avoided in the future by people minding their own business. There would be a small array of other possible motives to consider in regards to this.


The U.S. side of course has its own mistakes leading to the ship being where all later agreed it should not have been. This doesn’t well explain Israel’s “mistakes,” but it is true as they say this wouldn’t have – couldn’t have – happened if the messages pulling Liberty back had managed to get through to action. That two nations had to each commit their own inexplicable string of blunders all focused on this ship does not leave the two canceling each other out; rather, the strangeness is multiplied. If Washington were willing to somehow provide the Israelis with the target for “Operation Oops!” again, the issue of motive arises. And of course when dealing with two nations, we have the relative issues between them to consider – did their motives agree? Was there a double-cross halfway through? Why did this have to happen right before the U.S solidified its strategic partnership as Israel’s staunchest ally? High politics, way high up there… I’ve thought less and posted almost nothing yet on the American end and I’m not ready to make any case without more study.

My research is at the moment based on a critical examination of official and primary sources regarding the attack itself, in great detail. My sources are largely Israeli, with an emphasis on patterns of agreement or contradiction between each other, other sources, and logic. Eyewitness testimony is important as evidence, but prone to imprecision and embellishment, largely inconclusive on issues of intent, and well covered elsewhere by other revisionists. Therefore, at the moment I’m not basing much on the crew’s testimonies (although I m reading Ennes’ book at the moment and starting ti figure out who’s who a little more). The resulting posts are usually too verbose and detailed for most, but are compiled here for the advanced or intrepid.

Of course I am well aware this is a sensitive issue and one that raises questions about – well, anyone who’s so interested in re-visiting a sensitive issue. An issue that is also widely harped on by anti-Zionists, neo-Nazis, Muslim radicals, and other such rabble. Judging by Google searches, quite a few people are looking at this page and at me lately. Fair enough. I’ve actually been hoping for some feedback; the Comments section is open and easy to use (click the link at bottom of a post that usually says “0 comments.”). Who should click:

• the curious with their questions, 
  
• critics with rebuttals or debunks, 
  
• compatriots not too alienated by my omni-direcitional iconoclasm, 
  
• experts with a correction or a tip, 
  
• anyone with a relevant opinion. 

You can also contact me privately by submitting a comment headed “private.” I will read but not post these. Also my contact can be found in the sidebar. Silent lurkers are so boring, and my CIA sting operation to draw out all the wierdos for further profiling will fail if no one is drawn out! (kidding). I invite the opinionated as well on all sides – I can moderate. Oh, and I approve first, rather than delete later, FYI. At this post I will accept general comments.

DEAD IN THE WATER (VIDEO)

May 21 2009

This is the best-made, most informative documentary I've yet seen on the Liberty Incident. I don't buy every theory presented, but there are definitely some valuable bits, and it's a good introduction for the novice trying to grasp the issue. I will add some notes and comments below when I have time.

Google video page.

BLIND TRACKING THE LIBERTY

CURIOUS DISCONNECTS IN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
May 20 2009
last edit 5/21, 5pm

FIRST CONTACT
One of the more convincing counter-arguments to the friendly fire theory, often pointed out by Liberty survivors and others, is the detailed aerial surveillance that followed the ship all morning prior to the attack. They were circled as many as thirteen times, by some counts [1], but these inspections only seemed to make the IDF less and less aware of the vessel as the day wore on and got weird in the middle. Lt. Col. Matti Greenberg’s 1982 IDF report complained of “those who would claim that Israel had tracked the "Liberty" constantly and that IAF planes had carried out several reconnaissance overflights to identify the vessel. These claims have no foundation in reality.” [2] His own claim is only half-rooted in reality, at best. It may be technically true, as records seem to indicate, that “the IAF did not direct any sortie over the "Liberty" until 1400 hours.” However, it’s probably not true.

The first eye in the sky for June 8 was barely noted by the Liberty’s crew an hour after sunrise; when James Ennes took over as Officer of the Deck shortly after 0700 am, he relieved John Scott, who reported that “about an hour ago, we were circled by a flying boxcar. Real slow and easy.” [3] This and the bulk of the other IDF Air Force inspections were recorded in Ennes’ book Assault on the Liberty (1979), compiled from his shipmates’ recollections and his own. This early passage is not recorded in the Liberty’s Deck log, nor mentioned in Captain McGonagle’s testimony to the Naval Court of Inquiry (NCOI).

But the flight happened, and is well confirmed by Israeli Defense Force records. What was called “flying boxcar” was actually a similar model plane known as a Noratlas; it was on a routine coastal patrol, and held a naval observer who examined the Liberty as they chanced upon her. This was first reported at 05:45, clarified five minutes later; at first it looked like a destroyer, but as Greenberg’s report explained “later, at 0603 hours, an additional report arrived from the plane, which described the vessel as a supply ship of the US Navy.” [4] Illuminated by the early sun’s horizontal rays, the hull no. “GTR-5” was accurately noted, if not reported ‘til after the pilot landed. He did not report a flag, but the number and Jane’s Fighting Ships helped the navy identify their guest as the USS Liberty, American “research” ship. [5]

A potentially important issue: In the graphic below, note a small V-shaped aberration of the path just before the 0630 mark, and just after the 5:45 pass. Judge Cristol speculates “the maneuvers may have been undertaken to deceive the Aircraft into thinking that the ship under observation was heading for Port Said.” [6] I see no good reason the captain would order such a thing, but the timing is close – 5:45 first sighting, 5:53 c/c. The deck log records the maneuvers, all apparently at the steady ten knots recorded. There is no mention of a reason for the turn, aircraft or otherwise. K.J. Halliwell speculated it was to “blow tubes,” a way of cleaning the boilers. “Depending on wind direction,” he explained, “the ship may temporarily change course to blow tubes, to prevent the black soot from falling on its decks.” His case is incomplete but logical. [7]

It was around 1000 before this was decided for sure, and this would be her last accurate hull number reading of the day. It earned the ship a green marker on Naval HQ’s big tactical map - identified neutral non-combatant ship. She shouldn’t be there, but they don’t shoot at the green ones.

POINT ALPHA
There were no more over-flights reported by any party for three hours after this fruitful mission. At 0849, however, the Liberty reached its pre-set point Alpha, where it was to turn sharply west, heading 253° to point Bravo, and halve its speed to crawl along the Gaza/Sinai coast. Ennes oversaw this major turn, which was being executed as the second visitor was spotted behind them and to their right. Ennes claims this was just before 9:00, and that Captain McGonagle was next to him as they both watched “a jet” (no details) pass high along their starboard (right) side, then veer left several miles ahead east towards the Gaza coast. [8]

Neither the captain’s NCOI testimony nor the deck log note this aircraft. However, it happened, as again the IDF mentions it. A lone jet (no details) returning from some corner of the battlescape chanced up behind the ship. At first the pilot reported “gray, bulky, with its bridge amidships.” [9] Curiously, this pilot at first claimed he was shot at by Liberty, and this initiated a kneejerk sortie of two Israeli destroyers towards the hostile ship.

But just at the same time, the IDF’s story goes, the Liberty ID was agreed on, and they were recalled. Also the pilot said he wasn’t so sure he was fired on by the American ship after all. Lucky break for the hapless boat. Again, it was the last of the day. Point B would be reached at 1132, and a turn thirty degrees to the north towards distant point Charlie. By a twist, this final target was barely different from the Israeli Air Force “Point Boaz,” described by Greenberg as “the spot over which most IAF sorties would swoop into and out of Sinai.” This is probably where the 0900 flight came from, and their approach towards it in the mid-day means increasing air traffic, meaning some planes might have “appeared to the ship's crew as directed to them.” [10] This should be remembered and considered.

IN A PROVOCATIVE MANNER
From there the tone changed; the L-shaped sweep across their path (see graphic below) – in retrospect - is like a cut-off line beyond which they were not interested in keeping track of this vessel. The IDF admit to no more reports attributed to the Liberty after 0900, even though apparent surveillance intensified and even took on a menacing tone, to read Ennes’s account. “Just before 10 o’clock the bridge lookouts reported jet fighters approaching from astern,” he writes. “Off the starboard side, high, I could see two sleek delta-wing jets in tight side-by-side formation, paralleling our course.” They were armed with bombs he could see, but had no markings visible at the range. They tuned left a few miles ahead, and doubled back down port side, and turned again to repeat the loop. “They made three complete orbits before disappearing from view.” [11]

Captain McGonagle does attest to a similar pass of “two unidentified Jet aircraft orbited […] three times at a distance of approximately two miles.” [12] The two disagree on the distance, Ennes of course closer, and they disagree on time. McGonagle places it at 10:30 to his OOD’s 10:00. So far Ennes has a better track record on this issue, and 10:00 I’m going with, at the risk of being wrong on a minor point.

A half hour later, at the time the Captain places the fighters, “we received another visit from the flying boxcar,” Ennes reports, “now more curious and coming closer.” This is probably a different Noratlas than the one circling around 0600, which had landed around 9:30 and reported the hull no. This one approached from behind, paralleling their path off the starboard (right) side, turning left ahead, a full 180 turn back and down port side, then behind them. Not satisfied with the horseshoe, he sliced a dramatic turn back to an aggressive low-level approach and mast-level diagonal pass over the ship. As it showed its full belly, camera ports, and Star of David marking to the intruders, the captain feared it was attacking, according to the book: “Watch him. If you see those bomb bay doors start to open, order an immediate hard right turn.” [13]

The Noratlas pass was placed by the deck log at 10:57, blandly, as “unidentified aircraft circled ship.” [14] The captain swore that “it was not possible to see any markings on the aircraft and the identity of this aircraft remains unknown.” Curiously, he decided to point out how “this aircraft did not approach the ship in any provocative manner.” [15] Then why mention how it “did not” do so? Was it supposed to have? Was he troubled that he wasn’t “provoked” into leaving when it swooped over them? Unanswerable questions must be regarded as unanswered.

Ennes and mcGonagle agree on at least two more visits from this plane “in a somewhat similar fashion approximately at 30 minute intervals,” the captain says, at 10:57 and 11:26. [16] After its first 10:30 pass, “the flying boxcar returned just before eleven o’clock,” writes Ennes, “and again thirty minutes later, each time executing the now familiar counter-clockwise orbit before completing a low-level, diagonal, direct overflight of the ship. And each time I verified the condition of our flag,” perfectly displayed each time, no doubt. [17] Repeated tight defined orbits, no direct communication attempted, but attention-getting moves that almost read like warnings, following an extended show of arms, all apparently directed at the Liberty. I imagine if I were in charge of that ship, orders be damned, I’d leave the area quickly. But hindsight is always so clear, and besides, Captain McGonagle was more steadfast than I.

As Lt. Col. Greenberg and other offical sources have said, any impression of IAF surveillance or anything directed at the Liberty is just an illusion caused by the steady traffic of war. Israeli historian Michael Oren admits “there may indeed have been additional Israeli overflights, but the IAF pilots were not looking for the Liberty.” [18] Neither was the 6:00 flight, or the 9:00 one, but they both saw and reported it and it connected back. But at least three, and perhaps four close-up flights specifically orbited the ship, just in the next 2.5 hours. And we have no available records of any such interactions, let alone any explanation. I don’t see any reason a plane approaching point Boaz, or scanning for Egyptian submarines, would repeatedly conduct unreported swoops over an unidentified ship. Was it just a pilot having some sport?

YET MORE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
Shortly after the last verified Noratlas pass, Liberty arrived at point Bravo, and at 11:32 changed course to 283° to move towards point Charlie/Boaz. After that turn, Ennes was relieved briefly to get some lunch, leaving the deck in Lt. Painter’s hands from 1200-1300. He mentions “testimony from Liberty officers, ignored by the Naval Court of Inquiry, “of additional reconnaissance flights during the noon hour.” [19] From what I’ve seen (only part of the eyewitness reports), these are all equally vague regarding what craft, passing in what way, and just when and how often.

For example, Painter testified that somewhere in this hour “from the Bridge, I again observed the slow flying Israeli aircraft circle our ship.” [20] George Golden, considered the senior and “saltiest” sailor aboard, said he witnessed more surveillance in the noon hour and noted the flag extended at that time. [21] No details on the plane(s). The Salans memorandum, a State Department document from ’67 noted “testimony of various members of the crew indicate reconnaissance overflights of the Liberty at 0515 [sic], 0850,1030, 1056, 1126, 1145, 1220, and 1245.” No details. [22] This span remains an impressionist painting, for whatever reasons.

For Israeli records at this time, Cristol cites an unidentified ship “observed and even reported […] by other Israeli high-altitude aircraft the Liberty crew never sighted.” He cites a 1988 interview with an IAF pilot who flew 30,000 feet over the ship at noon, and reported it had ”no wake.” [23] This fits precisely with no shipboard sightings, meaning a 1200 entry needs to be added to the list, for four alleged encounters between 1130 and 1300. These would have been able to give excellent picture of speed and direction change if plotted as in the graphic below. A solid path from Liberty’s last location, on a near-west heading at a creeping five knots, slowness verified by report of “no [visible] wake.”

Although the data was all available, none of this was put together, at least not in the normal way. By 1300 everyone was wondering about the explosions on the Sinai shore, east and west of El Arish; the Liberty increased vigilance, and the IDF was following up, first hearing about the problem at about 11:30. Reports from land and unspecified air observations had either one or two unknown ships approaching and presumably shelling the shore at this time. As the last alleged overpass faded at 12:45, the torpedo boats of Division 914 were en route to investigate the mystery ship, with attack aircraft ready to scramble. You keep your recon planes away from your combat situations. This was the aerial calm before the storm.

THE SELF-BLINDED LEADING THE TRIGGER-HAPPY
So to summarize the IDF Air Force admits two Identifications at about 0600 and 0900, and then nothing, intelligence-wise, that was (or is now acknowledged to have been) connected back to this ship. There were overflights, sure, as many as eight of them - but officially these were on other business and any info that was accepted from them found no such link back. Somehow it was back to square one.

Of course this is all highly significant – the lack of new intelligence on the ship is the cited reason for Capt. Avraham Lunz at Naval HQ deciding to remove the ship’s neutral marker at 11:00 – leaving it unmarked at all – and not even mentioning this to the oncoming chief, Izzy Rahav. [24] Lunz’s decision has been the subject of some speculation; for example, he was the sole named part for possible court-martial in the Yerushalmi investigation. [25] The charges were dropped of course, and all the “mistakes” were ruled just that. He just didn't have current enough intelligence. (more detail in a later post)

The timing of the info cut-off is crucial, as that’s almost the moment she turned from point Alpha to Bravo and dropped from ten knots down to five. The heading change is less important – without turning she would hit the beach in less than an hour and halfway across the Sinai nearing the Gulf of Aqaba by noon. And if that fighter passed after 8:50, the new WSW heading was probably observed. Every Liberty overflight before 11:30 happened along that heading. It’s the logical path it would take if leaving.

Another aside and criticism: Cristol cites the ship as last seen “steering south at fifteen knots.” As I explain, the surest way to calculate speed is consider 9:00 position vs. 0600, which would verify a southeast path, app. 130° and 10 knots speed, as the deck log shows. Fifteen knots was not reached that morning, and “South,” “towards Port Said,” was only achieved once, during the possible tube-blowing event [see small text near the top], for about fifteen minutes, just after the first Noratlas pass. Although it’s possible this was seen, there is no evidence this minor movement effected Lunz’s decision, and even less reason it should have.

Far more important is the speed reduction of 50%, which occurred after the turn - at 9:05 by the deck log. This would be harder to predict and easier to miss; a single pass of a jet may be too short a sampling to determine speed very well. The better way is compare two positions over time; her speed until 0900 could well have been calculated for that three hour span. Only additional observation could help see the speed after 0900, and this was denied. Predicting a turn to the west, and projecting the 10 knots observed, would double her anticipated progress over the hours, taking Liberty much further out in the Mediterranean than she actually was.

This type of thinking is exactly what’s said to have influenced Lunz in his unfortunate erasure. As reported by Cristol “his explanation was that ships do not stand still.” They can actually, but this one was only close to still – five knots with “no [visible] wake.” But Lunz had cut off his awareness of the Liberty at some arbitrary point and “was of the opinion,” Cristol pleads, “that the ship had moved at least seventy-five miles from the point where it was previously sighted.” [25] For the Liberty to move that far since 0900, it would have to be going about 37 knots, twice her top speed, and more than seven times her current clip. If he meant since the first sighting at 0600, then he felt it was moving at 15 knots, 50% faster than it ever was that morning, and importantly he was foolishly ignoring the later sighting.

This ridiculous, ass-pulled-out-of “opinion” meant the fast ship was clearly of no concern to events in the area around El Arish. And that’s it. With no markers, no notes, or memories about an American ship recently in the area, any mid-size gray ship near some explosions was probably an enemy destroyer, and so on. The way was opened for an ensuing flood of errors, what can almost be seen as a well-orchestrated “Operation Oops!” The erasure was triggered Lunz's sheer ignorance, we're told, but as we can see, a lack of usable aerial surveillance was not the reason for that.

Sources:
[1] Bamford, Body of Secrets, p 206
[2] Greenberg, Matti, Lt. Col. The Attack on the "Liberty" Incident: 8 June 1967. IDF History Department, 1982. p 39. http://www.gtr5.com/evidence/idfhr.htm
[3] Ennes, James M., Jr. Assault on the Liberty. Random House, 1979. p 50]
[4] See [2], pp 7/8.
[5] See [2], pp 8/9.
[6] Cristol, A. Jay. The Liberty Incident. Brassey's Inc. 2002. p 40.
[7] Halliwell, K.J. source
[8] See [3], p 152.
[9] Oren, Michael B. The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed. Azure, Spring 2000. http://web.archive.org/web/20000917231200/http://www.azure.org.il/9-Oren.htm
[10] See [2], p 10.
[11] See [3], p 53.
[12] Naval Court of Inquiry Report. p 32.
[13] See [3] pp 54-55.
[21] Ennes, p 152.
[22] U.S. Department of State. Legal Advisor Carl F. Salans. "The Liberty" -- Discrepancies Between Israeli Inquiry and U.S. Navy Inquiry. 21 September 1967. http://www.gtr5.com/evidence/salans.htm
[23] Cristol, p 89.
[24]
[25]

"WHAT IS THIS? AMERICANS?"

ON LK'S "HUNCH"
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
May 16 2009
last edit 5/23

Within the drama of the IDF tapes surrounding the Liberty attack is the mystery of numerous witnesses to orders sent, intercepted, and read by American eyes to attack the ship despite the American flag. The official transcripts allowed to the public, despite other inconsistencies, agree in containing no mentions of a flag until helicopters after 15:00, either well after the attack, or well after the worst of it, depending on the accounts you believe. The tapes do however contain mentions of “Americans” on at least three occasions during the attack, each seeming strangely out of place. It might be reasonable to presume these witnesses just saw these lines amid the chatter, and deduced it was from a seen flag, perhaps embellishing the memory later. Conversely these might be the responses to the flag reports, severed from their other halves in the edited final, left hanging as random musings and blurted hunches.

As the case may be, the first “Americans” mention is one of the most interesting lines in the episode, delivered by one Lazar Karni, a weapons system officer based at General Headquarters who remains otherwise silent. His role is generally described as “to listen to ground-to-air communications and make occasional suggestions,” and at 13:54, the first fighters were just within view of the Liberty, preparing to assist the torpedo boats by initiating the attack on a presumed enemy something-or-other. Karni, known as “L.K.” in the transcripts, made his dramatic cameo appearance at this point:“What is this? Americans?”

Arieh O’Sullivan, who heard the tapes, explained that was “blurted out,” but was based only on “what he later testified was a hunch.” My curiosity was piqued by this “hunch,” since an American ship had been identified in the area that morning and mightn’t be entirely out of everyone’s minds, despite the efforts of fate to erase it.

Judge J.A. Cristol’s transcript of these tapes, which I discovered later as appendix 2 in his book, gives the line as "what is that? Americans?" He also offers as a sub-appendix invaluable first-hand insight into L.K.’s thinking - his July 1967 testimony to the second Israeli (Yerushalmi) investigation. Apparently working from these basic tapes, and with the same question I had, the examining judge wanted to know what that line was about. In testimony declassified at Cristol’s request, the weapons system officer describes his duty and reason for speaking up.

“I was not the officer who would have been able to decide on an attack, but it was my duty to be as a passive part on the line in order to absorb information that might have helped, but like any officer I wanted to help …”

Karni said of his own actions “it is clear to me that I threw in the question – a shout which is written. It does not relate to the conversation that was conducted on the line at that same moment. […] In relation to this there are two possibilities.” Strange comments – apparently he means the remark seems disconnected, implying it was from some side conversation, somehow making it into the wrong transcript. In fact the active discussion his question was disconnected from “was about an attack on missile bases,” he says. He then decides one possibility is “that this question was asked during a conversation […] about the ship that purposefully was shelling El Arish, and the Air Force was about to attack it jointly with the Navy.”

Once turned around to the episode his words are publicly attached to, he offers his reasoning for the comment, if that’s what he was commenting on. (??) Most importantly he did confirm to the court, in the last sentence, “I did not know about the existence of an American ship in the morning.” He certainly should have, of course, but apparently this is just a hunch, not an intentional reminder of the GTR5 ship. If he had been in the loop back at about 10am, quietly forgotten in his passive role, he would probably have absorbed the identification of Liberty in that area. So either he came on line only after it was removed from the tactical info system at 11am, or his testimony is incorrect. On the thinking Karni claimed:

“I at that time expressed an opinion that we had taken only one action, that is to say, we had ascertained it was not an Israeli ship, and we did this through the naval representatives who were sitting with us.
[…]
like any officer I wanted to help, and therefore I wanted to suppose to the ears of those who were managing the war to a possibility – supposition that it was an American ship. That was only my supposition, since it was my assessment that it was not Egyptian, for they would not dispatch a solitary ship to our coast, and therefore I thought there was such a possibility.” [??]

This logic consideration is a very good point Karni might bring up to explain his “supposition” and get people thinking, if only he were asked to explain his provocative comment. They would find it just a thought, but a good one, that it might be American or, for all they knew, Soviet. It’s somewhat reassuring that at least one soul in the IDF system showed the kind of sanity to put their neck out and blurt the unconsidered option everyone else had missed - they hadn’t yet identified this thing well enough.

“Shimon” (full name classified) is the deputy for one “Robert,” chief air controller at Air Control Central, who was on the line in Robert’s stead as LK dropped his thought bomb. The first to respond, Shimon asks as one might expect “what Americans?” This is included in Cristol’s version but not O’Sullivan’s. Kislev’s first response is to ask “Robert, what did you say?” (or “what are you saying?”) He may not have recognized “LK” as a participant and thought the question was posed by a returning “Robert.” Karni does not answer "Shimon's" query, nor does anyone respond to Kislev’s poorly-aimed question. The issue is apparently dropped like a hot potato and within seconds, all are proceeding with the attack on the mystery ship, which is but two minutes away.

Explaining the lack of response to the identification question, Cristol summarized “no one had any data on the location for Americans. Without hard data, the subject was not pursued further.” Strangely, Karni’s testimony implies a lively and curious response:

“All those who were connected on this line were able to hear me. Of course, all of them were overcome by this and they began to ask and then I did not want to delay the attack on the ship [because] they said it was shelling El Arish. And since the supposition was not based on data but on an assessment – supposition – therefore I did not want to delay the thing. Therefore I immediately retracted.”

So it seems by speaking up, the guy was willing to try and delay the attack with a worthwhile consideration - supposition. Something instantly changed his mind. It was the questions he cited, but if the transcripts are any clue, it wasn’t their number or their specificity. Perhaps something the transcript doesn't reveal, like the tone of either Shimon's or Kislev's voice, or how they emphasized their words, convinced Karni this was not a line of thought they were interested in.

Maybe his line was somehow cut off. It is curious he didn't follow-up with at least a "never mind." Such a line, if worth blurting, is worth a sequel as well. That it didn't get one is evidence something cut his train of thought off from the action. "My line went dead, so I guess I immediately retracted..." Hmmm... just trying the line out - not courtroom material, even if it were true.

Even the plain text of the audio released the controllers clearly showed an active disinterest in re-considering the situation; only two questions total were asked – "what Americans" and "what did you say." No answers was offered, pressed for or - it would seem - wanted. Ambiguity and second thoughts are the enemy of the decisive split-second life-and-death blahblahblah that had made Israel so great. As Karni’s testimony shows, nobody was willing to “delay the thing” that was already in mid-motion.
---
It was worth a try, Lazar, and we all thank you. You offered them a last chance out, and they refused to take it. You might rock the boat, but tipping it over is another story; ultimately of course you are a soldier of and loyal to Israel. You stood your ground and no one else's, and that's worthy of respect at least. Was it spooky, to be in the middle of all that blind volition?

TELEX AND TAPES, PART ONE

WORLD-WIDE TRANSCRIPTS?
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
May 15 2009
incomplete

TELEX MEMORIES
Among the greatest controversies of the USS Liberty saga is the widespread allegation of “secret recordings” of the attack, which revealed that the Israeli pilots were ordered to attack the ship despite the US flag they reported. I haven’t examined the history of when the issue was first publicly mentioned and so on, and for the most part I’m relying on John Crewdson’s ambitious 2007 Chicago Tribune piece that cites at least eight witnesses (with accounts of varying quality) who claim first-hand knowledge of the transmissions that show IDF command knew full well what there ordering sunk. [1]

Judge Cristol’s 2003 book cites the allegation as pushed by survivors James Ennes and George Golden (among “many others”), neither of whom would be in a position for first-hand knowledge of the recordings. He names no others and give neither detail nor citation, and offers in retort “thus far, no one has produced such a tape.” [2] Mitchell Bard’s rebuff is the same; “also, contrary to claims that an Israeli pilot identified the ship as American on a radio tape, no one has ever produced this tape.” [3]

Most of the witnesses Crewdson cites, and I’ll present below, seem to have no problem with the lack of a hard audio copy. Well, of course we aren't going to hear that... now. They are fairly consistent on how they received this information; the evidence claimed is paper-printed, English-language translations of the original Hebrew recordings. These were seen at, primarily, Air Force intelligence stations, at different locales around the world, and seen within hours of the attack (or during it, depending).

The original tapes these would be of UHF transmissions, which the IDF used at the time, meaning line-of-sight, or limited rage, reception would be needed. That is, the listener had to quite near the scene of attack. The Liberty is of course a spy ship itself, quite capable of recording the attack on itself, but I’m aware of no reports of surviving material released and attributed back to Liberty – anything it recorded and survived the attack is secret and unacknowledged. There is also the little-known case of the submarine(s) allegedly in the area, swimming secretly beneath the Liberty, for some top-secret reconnaissance of their own [4] I don’t think receiver antennae work as well underwater, but it is an interesting aside.

Then there is the third level, an airborne platform also in the vicinity well above the Liberty – a U.S. Navy EC 121, obviously unacknowledged then and for decades since. Its presence and mission were only published with the release of James Bamford’s 2000 Body of Secrets, and since then presumed as the origin of any recordings of the attack. They had different linguists on board, including Hebrew – monitoring on many frequencies, recording some for later analysis, and taking notes along the way. Their stories will be touched on in part two, for now, suffice to say, they believe they recorded and brought back all relevant transmissions of a lengthy attack, by air and surface vessels, on a U.S. ship. [5]

Once these tapes were transcribed and analyzed, copies might well be forwarded to certain locations at some security level or other – I’m not certain the reason diverse stations would be informed of such details in such an unusual case, but it’s possible – according to the witnesses this is just what happened. As I list them and some key details of their account to Crewdson and elsewhere, The debunker/debunk-pre-emptor in me has to note questions about each account as well as boosters as they occur.

THE WITNESSES: BOTHERED FOR LIFE
- Dwight Porter: U.S. ambassador to Lebanon at the time, Porter was a (relatively) early proponent of the recorded orders story; in a November 1991 interview with Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, as the website If America Knew reports:

“Porter says that during or immediately after the attack on the Liberty the CIA station chief showed him transcripts of intercepted Israeli messages. One has Israel ordering the attack on the Liberty, another has an Israeli pilot replying it’s an American ship. When the order to attack is repeated, the pilot insists he can see the American flag. The pilot is told again: “Attack it.” [6]

In Crewdson’s article, the transcript was shown through a different channel, an embassy official. Either is a bit unusual, as most other witnesses the Air Force loop. I’m not sure what to make of it.

- Oliver Kirby: Deputy Director of the then-secret NSA at the time of the attack on an NSA-commissioned spy ship. Decades later, when asked about the alleged transcripts, he said he “certainly did" read them, and it has “bothered me all my life.” He recalls the content, in part: "They said, 'We've got him in the zero […] And then one of them said, 'Can you see the flag?' They said 'Yes, it's U.S, it's U.S.' They said it several times, so there wasn't any doubt in anybody's mind that they knew it." [7] Of course the attack was then carried out. Sounds possibly authentic, and certainly no hack crank. We've got the big wigs testifying - this one on "a stack of bibles" if he had it, that they shot our flag knowingly.

- Richard Block: Capt. Block (USAF) commanding an intelligence wing monitoring the War from Crete, only 400 miles from thee Liberty attack. The “beyond top secret” translations re recalls reading demonstrated that “some of the pilots did not want to attack. The pilots said, 'This is an American ship. Do you still want us to attack?' And ground control came back and said, 'Yes, follow orders.’” [8] Sounds good – right job and location, a few details, consistent with the others. Unfortunately when he talked to the dismal American Free Press, as found re-posted on David Duke’s site, he sounded far less convincing. Calling the Israeli excuse “complete bull****,” he told the paper “They knew it was an American ship. We heard it with our own ears, several times.” [9] Ears? Indeed – Block’s story is that “We were getting the translations in real-time,” intercepted, tanslated, re-spoken, and broadcasting live for them? Even if that’s not quite what he’s arguing, it’s so far off the mark it can’t help but be an incorrect story. Block's hob-nobbing with the AFP crowd is also none too good for his credibility, and casts a pall over his public confrontations with Judge Cristol.

- Steve Forslund: An intelligence worker at Offutt AFB at the time, Forslund claims he saw the transcripts roll off at his station, and he gives a dramatic retelling:

"The ground control station stated that the target was American and for the aircraft to confirm it […] The aircraft did confirm the identity of the target as American, by the American flag. […] The ground control station ordered the aircraft to attack and sink the target and ensure they left no survivors. […] He kept insisting the mission had to sink the target, and was frustrated with the pilots' responses that it didn't sink." [10]

The details of his account carry a ring of authenticity to my ears. He asserts he was not alone; "everybody saw these." In a statement to the USS Liberty Survivor’s Association, he elaborated “We read these in real time during the day the attack occurred. […]On the day of the attack on the Liberty, I read yellow teletype sheets that spewed from the machines in front of me all day.” [11] His apparent claim of live transcription is about as dumb as Block’s real-time audio – perhaps he didn’t consider the hour as the attack was happening half-a-world away – 6:00 am Nebraska time, and continuing for about two hours maximum. If it was actually day, and “all day” when he read these, they weren’t real-time. This helps his case. But then he cites other gems including “intercepts of messages between the USA and Israel in which our government stated their knowledge of the Israeli's pre-emptive attack that began the war and warned Israel to cease their activities.” I see this as more diplomat talk than radio chatter material for "everybody" to hear, but I really am no expert.

- James Gotcher: Working at a NSA-linked Air Force Security Service center in Vietnam had the ink run past his eyes as well: “It was clear that the Israeli aircraft were being vectored directly at USS Liberty […] Later, around the time Liberty got off a distress call, the controllers seemed to panic and urged the aircraft to 'complete the job' and get out of there." [12] This account doesn’t sound totally right, but that could just be me. Gotcher is affiliated with the USS Liberty Survivors Association. In a sworn statement with them, he summarized the content in part: “the aircraft were flying a planned mission to find and sink USS Liberty. My understanding of what I read led me to conclude that the Israeli pilots were making every effort possible to sink USS Liberty and were very frustrated by their inability to do so.” No glitch this, he explains how the first time he saw it was a rough translation, and then the “final translations” were sent the same way the next day, even though there were “virtually no differrence between the two versions.” These were followed first by an internal NSA report announcing a deliberate attack, and then a conspicuous recall and order to destroy all three. [13]

- W. Patrick Lang: That copies of these papers survived any attempted erasure would explain Lang’s story. An Army colonel studying advanced military intelligence at Ft. Holabird, MD, he claims he saw these transcripts used as source material in an advanced intelligence class some time after the attack.

"In the transcript, the flight leader spoke to his base to report that he had the ship in view, that it was the same ship that he had been briefed on and that it was clearly marked with the US flag. I think he said that the ship was displaying the US flag on an upper deck, but my memory of that might be inexact. He asked for confirmation of his orders to attack the ship and seemed reluctant (understandably) to attack the ship. He asked more than once and was told to carry out his orders and attack the ship.” [14]

The implied “briefing” is very interesting, something I’ve not noticed in other accounts. Lang’s own website – which mostly reviews quality fictional films – explains more in detail how this came to be. The information was produced on the base for limited use in the class. I imagine these were not “take home” books. This was in winter 1967/68, so about six months after the attack, he recalls. Sounds plausible, just enough detail for a Tom Clancey flick.

All in all that’s a case – not a lot of credible witnesses, but how many would there be with top secret clearance at that time, or with talkative friends who did? Enough people have agreed in a fairly consistent manner that something interesting can’t help but be at work here – either a widespread campaign to lie this myth into being, or the transcripts really did show what these people have said they did. That a NSA deputy Director and a State Department diplomat are among the witnesses lends weight to the notion, and it seems highly likely that such transcripts were circulated at the time. If true, it is interesting to note – this stuff was not hushed up among the intelligence sector, even if the news media was gagged in the trunk over it. One at least saw it well after any “lid” was clamped on, and as only a prospective member of the intelligence community.

For all we know the transcripts were physically real but factually phony - some kind of forgery slipped in to the intelligence system by someone with a grudge against Israel. This sounds outlandish enough on its own, and gets further complicated if we’re discussing real-time dispersal. So probably not. Whatever its informational origin, if this were a real circulated artifact, there would be multiple copies still in existence – telex printouts on paper, or photocopies/photographs of same, and to my knowledge have never been published, posted on the internet, or definitively claimed by anyone, or even forged to my knowledge. Everybody seems to agree – once widely seen, the papers are all gone to oblivion or the vault, and only human memory cells hold the imprint. And presumably most of those are tighter-lipped than the ones we've heard.

The recordings themselves are at least as distant, and as noted at the outset, no one has produced such a tape. There were those on the U.S. side who said they recorded the attack, and the Israelis, to their credit, have produced their own tape of the incident. These will be the subject of part two.

Sources:
[1] Crewdson, John. "New revelations in attack on American spy ship." Chicago Tribune. October 2 2007. (Additional material published Dec 2). http://www.chicagotribune.com/services/newspaper/printedition/tuesday/chi-liberty_tuesoct02,0,1050179.story
[2] Cristol, Jay A. "The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship." Brasseys, 2003. Page 58.
[3] Bard, Mitchell G. "Myths & Facts Online: The 1967 Six-Day War." Jewish Virtual Library. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf6.html
[4]

LIBERTY MISIDENTIFICATION, ENCORE

ON THE ORDER NOT TO ATTACK: RECEIVED, RESOLVED
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
re-written with new info May 13 2009
last update 5/23

WHAT STOPPED THE SINKING?
The deadliest phase of the attack on the USS Liberty was the surface torpedo strike that followed twenty minutes after the air attack ended; with six torpedoes pointed at her starboard side, and under the control of those to whom everything looked Egyptian, the defenseless ship could well have been sunk. For whatever reason, and this is a bit of a mystery, only one torpedo of the five launched made its mark, blasting a 30-foot hole just below the waterline, killing 25 and causing the ship to list dangerously, but leaving her afloat and eventually able to limp towards safe harbor unaided.

The sixth torpedo was held, and never fired, as the blitzkrieg assault was finally called off. Conspiracy Theorists have long argued the intent was to fully sink the Liberty, and only fear of a confrontation with US aircraft reported en route chased them off. As the epic Admiral Thomas H. Moorer wrote in his pivotal 30-year anniversary statement on the “ridiculous” Israeli story:

“As we know now, if the rescue aircraft from U.S. carriers had not been recalled, they would have arrived at the Liberty before the torpedo attack, reducing the death toll by 25. The torpedo boat commanders could not be certain that Sixth Fleet aircraft were not on the way and this might have led to their breaking off the attack after 40 minutes rather than remaining to send the Liberty and its crew of 294 to the bottom.” [1]

The Israeli Defense Force of course claims the whole attack was horrendous error, and this part in particular is painted as a final tragic glitch – it was simply called off when they realized they were wrong. A surface reading of the presented facts looks almost like IDF Naval Headquarters became aware finally what they were attacking, and tried to stop the torpedo attack, but the message came too late, or too far to the left, or whatever, to stop the near-fatal blow. I’ve seen just this interpretation argued, and based on two separate attempted delays, in favor of the friendly fire/fog of war rationale.

Such a reading is not, however, consistent with a careful examination of the IDF’s own self-exculpations, which reveal a more troubling reality in each case.

THE FIRST CONFUSION
En route to the Liberty, the three Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) of Division 914, under Commander Moshe Oren, were in contact with the aircraft then attacking the ship. On this channel, they received early reports of a flagless, unidentifiable Arab Destoryer, in line with the Division’s own radar readings and reports of shelling. The problem for the attack came when the hull-marking “CTR-5” was reported to general HQ in Tel Aviv by the last attacking pilot, at 14:11. “Pay attention. This ship's markings are Charlie-Tango-Romeo 5.” [2] This was apparently not communicated directly to Division 914, but did go to their controllers at “homeland,” Air Force HQ in Tel Aviv, and from there to the Navy.

“CTR-5” is not exactly accurate, but reasonably close to the Liberty’s “GTR-5” that had been perfectly identified from the air hours earlier, and logged at Naval HQ in Haifa. Initially tagged as a US Navy supply ship, she was designated neutral by the navy chief presiding there, RADM Shlomo Erell, and by 10 am identified as the USS Liberty, spy ship. But that data was “removed from the agenda” in Haifa, as one IDF report accurately sums up, about an hour later. [3] (we’ll return to this below).

Arguably the Air Force could have and should have been aware of this known non-combatant vessel, and had their own notes to make the connection to this report, but apparently CTR-5 meant nothing in particular to them. However, it did clearly and loudly indicate one thing – it was not an Arab vessel, and Col. Shmuel Kislev instantly called the attack off with a terse “leave her.” [4] From this moment AF HQ became concerned about the ship’s identity, dreading a Soviet ID. This concern was passed to the Navy, who had their MTBs at the ready for attack – their records show it coming through to them at 1414, further garbled as “CPR-5.” [5] Michael B. Oren’s 2000 Case Closed is probably the most widely-read recitation of what happened next:

”While Egyptian naval ships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. The fact that the ship had Western markings led [Gen. Yitzhak] Rabin to fear that it was Soviet, and he immediately called off the jets […] while the torpedo boat squadron was ordered to hold its fire pending further attempts at identification. Though that order was recorded in the torpedo boat's log, Oren claimed he never received it.” [6]

The early IDF sources I’ve studied generally agree that a) the hold your fire order was sent, and b) Commander Oren claimed, in testimony along the way, he didn’t receive it. Neither the Ram Ron’s nor Yerushalmi’s nor Greenberg’s connect these two in the way modern apologists sometimes do. Greenberg’s 1982 report acknowledged the ambiguity; Commander Oren “later testified that he did not receive the order from Naval Operations/3. […] However, […] an attempt was made to identify the vessel, although this was difficult due to the billowing clouds of smoke […]. As a result, the Division Commander cancelled the attack order.” Here it’s Oren’s decision due to his own inability to clear up the confusion he – wasn’t told of? This report summarizes, whatever the reason, “the end result was the same - the torpedo Division held its fire and approached the target in order to more clearly identify the vessel.” [7]

THE RESOLUTION: MIS-ID, REDUX
However, this whole controversy illustrates and draws attention to an alarming reality, as shown in the primary evidence, that the IDF allowed its confusion to be canceled out by Division 914’s ineptitude. I found an English-language copy of the MTB logs, as well as those of their controllers at Stella Maris. obtained by Judge Cristol (I do appreciate this aspect of his work). These were translated by someone he knew, and I suspect they’re pretty accurate. “Sea/3” is Stela Maris, then under Capt. Izzy Rahav. “Div” refers to Division 914, the MTBs. The order “1 9 [Tesha Vuv],” is some code that clearly means torpedo attack.

1411 – Order from Sea/3 – “We told the birds to leave after this strike, you go in.”

1415 – Aircraft left.

1419 – Going in for torpedo attack. 1 9. [Tesha Vuv]

1420 – Order from Sea/3 “Do not attack. There might be misidentification by the aircraft. Did any men go overboard? An Air Force helicopter is coming.”

1426 – Our identification indicates it may be a commercial vessel. Reported to Sea/3. Order to Div from Div CDR, Cancel 1 9 [Tesha vuv]. [8]

From this we can see the change in orders clearly transmitted from HQ, logged at 1420, and repeated from Commander Oren to his boats six minutes later. “Order to Div” means from Oren, whereas “from Sea/3 is to him. Whatever he thinks he’s talking about not receiving, it’s clear this order was received and acted on.

Yet, as we know, about ten minutes later, he ordered the Division’s torpedoes launched. The reason was not that he thought the original orders stood; rather, he and his men created a new misidentification from the ground up, negating the aircraft’s observation. Worthy of note Is that the log entries regarding this are out-of-order and unclear, running 1433, 1436, 1427?, 1435, 1437.

1427? - We tried to establish identification by light signal, “What ship?” She replied: “AA.” The vessel is all in smoke. Only the front is visible with a gun.

1435 – Div commander detected firing flashes coming from the vessel.

1437 – T-203 Identified the El Quiser, a supply ship. We checked and it seems to be reasonable. Div reported to Sea/3 that we are going in for torpedo launch. Order to Div 1 9 [Tesha Vuv]

It is corroborated by the Liberty's crew that their ship fired first, in some unfortunate error, with their weak machine guns. But no provocative "AA" (identify yourself first) message was flashed by the crew - any signal the MTBs saw was some illusion, and one that reminded commander Oren of an Egyptian ship he once encountered. [9] Given the real firing and imagined signals, plus the semi-fit with the El Quseir, Egyptian enemy perhaps seems a justifiable conclusion (the misidentification is covered more in-depth in another post). Indeed, justifications have been offered.

So, in the larger context, Naval HQ/Sea/3 starts out with incorrect news of the shore being shelled, meaning a warship. They had just finished being aware of the unarmed Liberty GTR-5. The MTBs find a radar target going 30 knots to Egyptian port – attackable speed and attackable heading and both drastically wrong. Aircraft are called in, decide in bizarre error it looks like a destroyer with cannons, and attack repeatedly. Someone finally notices a single non-Arabic clue, throwing a wrench into the previously smooth operation of error. The dumb-asses of the air Force are ordered to leave the field while the experts on the surface come in to fix things. Known to only have ID books for Arab vessels, the MTBs are tasked with re-identifying it and decided it was an Arab auxiliary ship after all and hostile. What a Mitzvah it was to have kids like the ones of Division 914 handy to clear up the confusion and make attack kosher again.

SEA 3’S ACCEPTANCE: INAPPROPRIATE
Anyone paying attention and trying the slightest to avoid a mistake would:
A) Consider that the ship they were after – capable of shelling, and clocked at 30 knots – was getting away in all this distraction with a slow unarmed confusing vessel or
B) realize that that first ship never existed, and was just this ship that had been misidentified in at least five different ways already and refuse to accept another version as the basis for a final attack and the sinking of the ship.

But T-203’s “reasonable” decision was apparently good enough for both Commander Oren and thence to Capt. Rahav at Naval HQ. Just twenty minutes earlier he had been informed of the alarming non-Arabic markings that might mean a Soviet vessel had been mistakenly attacked. Now that that vessel was found to resemble one Arab ship (so the kids are telling him) and it was shooting some kind of gun, any certainty was apparently tossed aside. Sea/3 war log, 1436, reads “identification [as El Quseir] is definite. Approval was made for torpedo attack.” [10]

By this time, of course, the IDF’s info on *GTR-5 USS LIBERTY, neutral ship, in vicinity of el Arish* was lost to the ether; a simple note, any flicker of memory of anyone present before 11:00 might have helped avoid honest confusion. But Admiral Erell, who had overseen that identification, was out of the room as of then, down at Haifa harbor for some never-explained business. As he left Capt. Avraham Lunz erased the Liberty’s neutral marker, since he felt it was gone, without telling Erell’s replacement, Rahav, that it had ever been there. [11] As reports of shelling from that area started coming in a half hour later, he ordered the MTBs in and ordered an air strike readied. By the time the attack was half-done and the hull no. was reported to Stela Maris, at 1414 (garbled as “C P R 5”), Admiral Erell who might have understood, was still away from the command center – and so confusion reigned at naval HQ, which quite quickly devolved into the torpedo attack on the Liberty.

Cristol’s book argues that Rahav may have felt obliged to allow the Div to attack, since they were under fire. [12] Oddly, war log entry for 1437, right after sink approval “The target did not open fire, the Div is shelling it with gunfire.” [13] This must be a typo or translation error as the Liberty of course did fire and the MTBs recorded it in their log – and this was apparently part of the reason to re-justify the sinking of the CTR-5 ship.

It is true that command center has a less clear view of the physical operation; they rely on reports, and have to form mental images that can be wrong. But Cristol’s assessment is worthy of note here; first, hypothesizing Rahav’s awareness of the shooting, but not of their El Quseir ID, he mused “if the MTBs were engaging an Egyptian destroyer, they were in mortal danger,” and Rahav’s re-authorizing the suspended Tesha vuv order “was appropriate.” After this thought exercise, Cristol offers no evidence Rahav still though it was a destroyer. In fact, the author provides a small handful of clues to the contrary – he should have realized this was not a deadly warship, as had been presumed during the air attack. His authorization was based on the ID as El Quseir, which is nowhere near a warship. “Nevertheless, Rahav responded “Tesha Vuv approved.”” [14] Whether he meant to or not, Cristol is explaining how this decision was not appropriate in response to a mis-identified small vessel armed only with machine guns. Of course, it’s hard to get around the sense that something went wrong here, and inappropriate is perhaps softening the reality, but it’s at least a step past knee-jerk absolvism.

CANCELED AGAIN/LINGERING DOUBTS
In his book, Cristol cites no controversy over the 14:20 “do not attack” order, taking as evident that fire was held until re-approved based on the “definite” Arab ID and some kind of “firing.” He instead places the controversy of Oren and his orders over a different attempted halt – from Admiral Erell himself, who had just then returned and ordered the attack stopped.

Ironically, Admiral Erell.’s own son Udi was among the MTB crew flailing in the dark just when his Dad’s knowledge was most needed – in fact, on the crew of T-203, who fired the successful hit. His knowledgeable father remained out for almost exactly the duration of the disaster, according to Judge Cristol, returning from the harbor apparently just after Rahav gave his approval for tesha vuv, but before the torpedo strike was reported – so between 1436 and 39 Sea/3 time. He quickly sent word to halt the attack – there had been a mix-up. “Commander Oren stated he did not receive the order,” Cristol writes, but “there is evidence that the order was received by the CIC officer on MTB 204.” Though he has no citation, and the MTB log at least shows no such order from Sea/3 at this time. [15]

The Liberty’s logs show the first torpedo pass at 1434 and the impact of the second at 1435 – eight minutes before the MTB log entry noting it at 1443. Other points support a time offset of about 8 minutes between their chronologies (MTBs ahead). So to avoid confusion, I’m dealing in MTB log time, by which the attack was canceled by Commander Oren at 1447, four minutes after the torpedo hit. The Div also seems ahead of Sea/3, by about four minutes, so I specify by whose time. Sea/3’s log reports torpedo hit at 1439, and their 1443 entry has the first thing like a cancellation; “if the target is sinking, stop fire and take survivors.” [16] This does correspond with Oren’s cancellation, but that was announced with the cryptic 1447 entry “One more attack. After identification of mark, order to the Div to cease fire. Attack called off.” [17] His decision was apparently informed less by any order from Sea/3 than by “identifying” a “mark.” Just what is not explained.

Sea/3’s 1446 entry (1450 MTB time, so a bit late) explains “The Div reports the marking is C T R 95.” [18] The 9 is an unusual variation I can’t imagine them actually seeing, so likely just a typo, and again, we’re presented with that giant “5” and mysterious CTR prefix that reads clearly in Hebrew as “not Arab.” This exact finding is not mentioned in the MTB’s log, but clearly the mark they noted is the same one the pilots had reported 30 minutes earlier. It was apparently enough for Oren to call it off over, and he was denied two different sources (Sea/3 and the aircraft direct) for variations of that mark. This does not excuse the decision to sink the ship, but it is curious how key facts just refused to get to the right people, spreading the blame around as Division 914 undid their predecessors’ findings only to re-create them again ten minutes and five torpedoes later.

Interestingly, Cristol’s book fails to mention the early identification of the ship’s “mark,” seen at the bow of the ship, right side, as he argues for utter confusion that lingers. * He does mention the episode five minutes later when some letters were found on the back of the ship that indicated to them Soviet. But not the giant letters on the front five minutes earlier. [19] The reason for this omission is not entirely clear.

* Note: I goofed this - the same identification, along with the name "LIBERTY" are on the rear of the ship. Took me a while to find a photograph of this. So they could have seen "the mark" at either end. But again, their log puts it at 1447. Sea/3's 1451: "My [sic] be Russian nationality, based on writing on aft," matches the MTB log's 1451: "Report to C3: "Vessel may be Russian [...] based on writing on back of vessel." Da, "Liberty" does have that Stalinist flavor, don't it? Can't read English? They could have spelled it out like they did C-T-R. But they apparently missed it until just before their 1640 entry where "Liberty" is first mentioned nearly two hours after they first floated past it.


Sources:
[1]Moorer, Thomas H. Adm. “Attack on the USS Liberty, June 8,
1967.” Memorandum to Americans for Middle East Understanding. June 8 1997. http://web.austin.utexas.edu/chenry/usme/moorer.html
[2], [4] Air-Ground communications, transcript. Jerusalem Post, 2004. 14:11. My re-post.
[3], [7] Greenberg, Matti, Lt. Col. "The Attack on the Liberty Incident." Israeli Defense Forces history department. 1982.
[5] Israeli Defense Forces. Sea Section/3 war log. WARLN. June 8 1967. English language translation. PDF available at: http://www.thelibertyincident.com/israellogs.html
[6] Oren, Michael B. The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed. Azure, Spring 2000. http://web.archive.org/web/20000917231200/http://www.azure.org.il/9-Oren.htm
[8] Israeli Defense Forces. Division 914 war log. WARL914. June 8 1967. English language translation. PDF available at: http://www.thelibertyincident.com/israellogs.html
[9] See 6, also Cristol p53, etc.
[10] ...
[19] Cristol, p. 57

UNABLE TO PURSUE

THE MYTH OF FIGHTER DISPATCH
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
May 12 2009
incomplete

So far in my studies on the USS Liberty incident, there has been a general acceptance among apologists as to when and why fighter aircraft were called in. The Motor Torpedo Boats were first dispatched to ‘investigate’ the erred shelling reports, and it was supposedly their erred radar reading that added the urgency only fighters could answer – another escalation based on error, typical of friendly fire incidents. I’m not familiar with the full body of evidence and arguments, but I’ll cite two of the most prominent that I have in front of me. Michael B. Oren’s 2000 article Case Closed explained:

"The torpedo boats gave chase, but even at their maximum speed of 36 knots, they did not expect to overtake their target before it reached Egypt. Rahav therefore alerted the air force, and two Mirage III fighters were diverted from the Suez Canal, northeast to the sea."[1]

Judge Jay A. Cristol’s 2003 The Liberty Incident likewise reasoned “if the Liberty continued at twenty-eight knots, as the Israeli naval force thought,” then the MTB’s current 36 knots could not close the gap before the enemy reached ‘home port.’ Their top speed of 42 might have sufficed, but still… Being fond of discussing some ‘rivalry’ between Isreali air force and navy, Cristol reasons as others have, “if the Israeli Navy had believed it could reach and overtake the target, it is inconceivable that the navy would have called for help from the air force.” Cristol cites the Stella Maris log entry: “Division 914 is reporting that targets are sailing west at 30 knots. An order was made to double check speed. He can not chase them. Suggests dispatch aircraft.” [2]

The aircraft arrived shortly, misidentified Liberty as a destroyer and blew the hell out of the hull and the American kids on it. It might then seem a tragic result of a natural response to a reasonable radar error. The reality of the evidence is that this dispatch of combat-ready aircraft was agreed to well before the navy knew what the radar returns would tell them. The MTB division’s log book shows for the 1321 entry “Div asked sea/3 “When will aircraft be dispatched?” Sea/3 answered, “When we have radar contact.”" Sea/3 means Stella Maris. The next entry was twenty minutes later, reporting said contact. [3]

This log makes no mention of the speed or heading, nor a request for aircraft. Instead, it just notes that jets are now on their way, directed to make radio contact once there. It seems to me the MTB and Sea/3 logs are offset about four minutes, so the div’s 1321 corresponds to Sea/3’s 1317: “Shelling of El Arish from the sea is continuing. It was reported to Moshe Oren and he was ordered to tune into air/sea channels 86 and 186 as our aircraft are en route.” 1320’s entry is a similar repetition, and 1343 has “MTB Div has a contact. Looks like it is maneuvering.” THEN the 1347 entry cited by Cristol, that the div was requesting air assistance because of the target’s speed. [4]

That the dispatch was already planned, and the jets already on their way before radar contact was made, to read Sea/3, could have non-conspiratorial reasons; perhaps it was presumed or guessed that the target would be too fast. To divert aircraft while in heavy combat mode is not done lightly, but this either seemed a serious danger, or was a serious operation of some kind and warranted a pre-arranged dispatch “just in case.”

However, this only heightens the surreality of the radar reading that only confirmed what the command had already decided. I'm no expert, but I'll say flat out that a 28 knot reading for a five-knots vessel is not at all likely; I’ve still seen no plausible reason a several minute radar watch should result in a nearly 600% error of speed, plus a 23 degree heading error indicating it had an Egyptian home. That this whole radar contact business looks like just a formality for a pre-decided course multiplies this troubling reality sixfold again.

Neither Judge Cristol nor Michael Oren mentions this pre-existing agreement. As I noted there could be an honest explanations, but there are already so many errors and questionable decisions to explain, it’s understandable they would just wait for the part where the ‘request’ was made, since that fits more simply and gracefully with the natural flow-of-errors narrative. It does not fit as well with the truth.

Sources:
[1]Oren, Michael B. The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed. Azure, Spring 2000. http://web.archive.org/web/20000917231200/http://www.azure.org.il/9-Oren.htm
[2] Cristol, Jay A. The Liberty Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Brasseys, 2003. Page 39.
[3] Israeli Defense Forces. Division 914 war log. WARL914. June 8 1967. PDF available at: http://www.thelibertyincident.com/israellogs.html
[4] Israeli Defense Forces. Sea Section/3 war log. WARLN. June 8 1967. PDF available at above link.